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A R T I C L E S

Plain Meaning,
Precedent, and
Metaphysics:
Interpreting the
“Addition”
Element of the
Clean Water Act
Offense
Jeffrey G. Miller
Jeffrey G. Miller is Professor of Law
Emeritus at Pace Law School.

T

his Article examines the meaning of the simple
word “addition” in the first element of the Clean
Water Act (CWA)1 prohibition against any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source by any person, unless in compliance with a permit.
Neither the U.S. Congress nor the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has defined “addition” in this
context. EPA and the courts have interpreted the element
broadly to expand the offense. Some of their broad interpretations threaten to make felons of innocent persons
owning a particular class of point sources: those conveying pollutants added by others to navigable waters. EPA’s
conflation of “addition” with “navigable waters,” including
its theory that all navigable waters are one entity, threatens
to eviscerate half of the CWA’s regulatory strategies and
programs: water quality standards, one of the CWA’s two
grand strategies for pollution control; and §404, one of the
CWA’s two permit programs for assuring water quality.
The Article examines administrative and judicial interpretations of “addition” as an element of the CWA. It suggests
a definition that fits all appropriate fact situations, while
avoiding both threats to innocent point source owners and
to the viability of the water quality standards and wetlands
protection programs. It rejects the need for and legality of
EPA’s theory of unitary navigable water, EPA’s water transfer rule based on that theory, and much of EPA’s “outside
world” theory of “addition.”

I.

Summary
The Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source
by any person without a permit. Surprisingly, the
first element of this prohibition, “addition,” remains
undefined. It has been interpreted broadly by regulators and judges to expand the prohibition to such
an extent that it threatens to capture innocent people.
EPA in particular has confused “addition” with “navigable waters” to such an extent that it threatens to
eviscerate half of the CWA’s regulatory strategies and
programs: water quality standards and the §404 program protecting wetlands. This Article examines the
interpretation of “addition” within the CWA. It suggests a definition that would not unduly expand the
provision nor emasculate EPA regulatory programs. It
rejects EPA’s unitary water theory in favor of a more
workable solution.
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No Statutory Definition

Section §301(1) prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant
by any person,”2 unless in compliance with several listed
sections. The listed sections authorize the issuance of
two types of CWA permits3 and specify their substantive
requirements. Section 502(12) defines “discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”4 In sum, the subsection
Author’s Note: The author acknowledges and thanks Laura Young,
Pace 2015, for her assistance in completing the research and analysis
for and editing of this Article, and Christine Swatzell, Pace 2012,
for her assistance in the initial research and analysis for the Article.
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	

Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA
§§101-607.
33 U.S.C. §1311(1).
Permits issued pursuant to §402, 33 U.S.C. §1342, regulate water pollution; permits issued pursuant to §404, 33 U.S.C. §1344, regulate
filling wetlands.
33 U.S.C. §1362(12). Because the term defined in §502(12), “discharge
of a pollutant,” is not exactly the same as the term used in §301(a), “the
discharge of any pollutant,” the definition in §502(12) arguably does not
apply to the phrase used in §301(a). However, courts routinely refer to
§502(12) as defining “discharge of a pollutant” in §301(a), without noting
the difference. (Emphasis added throughout.) See, e.g., Committee to Save
Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 307, 24 ELR 20225
(9th Cir. 1993); Apalachicola Riverkeeper v. Taylor Energy Co., LLC, 2013
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prohibits: (1) any addition (2) of any pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from any point source (5) by any person,5
except in compliance with a CWA permit. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg has called this the “core command “of
the CWA.6
This Article, the first in a series of five, examines how
EPA and the courts have interpreted the prohibitory clause
“addition”—a common noun form of a verb with no statutory definition—from 1972 to 2013.7 It seeks to provide a
definitive analysis of the term “addition”; and to explore
the methods that EPA and courts have used to interpret
the element.
Together, the five articles examine how EPA and the
courts have interpreted the initial four jurisdictional elements of the water pollution control offense. Single articles
examine each of the first four elements and a fifth article
explores differences in the techniques courts have used to
interpret them. The natures of the key words in these elements are very different: (1) “addition,” a common noun
form of a verb with no statutory definition; (2) “pollutant,” a common noun with a statutory definition meaning
or excluding specific substances or classes of substances,
some of the included substances not fitting the common
understanding of “pollutant;” (3) “navigable waters,” a
traditional Commerce Clause jurisdictional phrase with a

5.	

6.	

7.	

WL 3779166 (E.D. La.); United States v. Bailey, 516 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D.
Minn. 2007); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292, 1295, 5 ELR
20039 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev’d in part & modified in part on other grounds,
Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Col, 412 F. Supp. 1096, 6 ELR 20363 (N.D. Cal.
1976), aff’d, Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 8 ELR 20480 (9th
Cir. 1978).
“By any person” is not included in the §502(12) definition. It is the last
of the elements because it follows “discharge of a pollutant” in §301(a).
There is little controversy about the interpretation of “person” as defined
in §502(5). The element is important because it confines violations of the
CWA to the consequences of human activities. Of course, it is difficult to
conceive of a civil or criminal offense without a human action.
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S.
261, 298 (2009). The author has called it elsewhere “the basic prohibition”
of the CWA. See Jeffrey G. Miller et al., Introduction to Environmental Law: Cases and Materials on Water Pollution Control 141
(2008).
The other elements in the clause are similarly worthy of individual analysis, although space constraints preclude discussion of them in this Article.
Briefly, “pollutant” is a common noun with a statutory definition meaning or excluding specific substances or classes of substances, some of the
included substances not fitting the common understanding of “pollutant.”
33 U.S.C. §1362(6). “Navigable waters” is a traditional Commerce Clause
(U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. (3)) jurisdictional phrase with a short statutory
definition having nothing to do with waterborne transportation. 33 U.S.C.
§1362(7). The touchstone of “navigable water” for Commerce Clause jurisdictional purposes is use in waterborne navigation. See The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. 557 (1870)). “Point source” is an artificial construct with a statutory definition, followed by lists of examples and exclusions. 33 U.S.C.
§1362(14). The key word in the final element, “person,” is defined in the
normal legal sense (33 U.S.C. §1362(5)) and has led to virtually no litigation, although it has great importance. Disputes over the interpretations of
the first four statutory terms have produced a steady stream of reported decisions since the initial implementation of the statute. Even after four decades,
many of these issues are unresolved and new issues continue to surface.
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short statutory definition having nothing to do with waterborne transportation; and (4) “point source,” an artificial
construct with a statutory definition, followed by lists of
examples and exclusions. The key word in the final element,
“person,” is defined in the normal legal sense and has led
to virtually no litigation, although it has great importance.
Disputes over the interpretations of the first four statutory
terms have produced a steady stream of reported decisions
since the initial implementation of the statute. Even after
four decades, many of these issues are unresolved and new
issues continue to surface.
“Addition,” the noun form of the verb “to add,” is the
action noun in the offense. Because offenses are actions,
“addition” is the central element in the offense. This is
more easily seen by rearranging the offense as a sentence:
A person illegally adds pollutants to navigable water from
a point source, unless he is in compliance with a permit.
“Person” is the subject of the sentence, “adds” is the verb,
and “pollutant” is the object. The rest of the sentence is a
series of prepositional phrases: “to navigable water,” “from
a point source,” “in compliance,” and “with a permit.” All
of these prepositional phrases are adverbial phrases, modifying “adds.” The last phrase, a defense rather than an element of the offense, is a compound phrase, but is still an
adverbial propositional phrase modifying “adds.”
It is important to keep the centrality of “addition” in
mind when addressing the disputes considered in the Article. Many of the defendants in these disputes raised “the
passive point source” defense. They argued that their point
sources added no pollutants to water, but merely conveyed
already polluted water to downstream navigable water. The
point sources were wholly passive, adding nothing that
was not in the water already, and the defendants owning
the point sources therefore did not violate the statute. This
argument subtly rearranges the structure of the offense,
making “point source” rather than “person” the subject
of the sentence. It would make the sentence read: A point
source illegally adds pollutants to navigable water by any
person except in compliance with a permit. That, of course,
makes no sense. The offense, like all other offenses, prohibits human conduct and activity, not point source conduct
and activity.
Typical CWA cases involve industries or municipalities
adding their pollutants to navigable waters through their
own point sources (usually outfall pipes) from their own
operations. The §402 permit program is designed with
these cases in mind. Atypical cases involve persons adding
their pollutants to navigable waters through point sources
owned or operated by others. The statute explicitly deals
with many but not all of these atypical cases. For instance,
the pretreatment program in §307(b) controls industrial
discharges of pollutants into municipal sewers leading to
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municipal treatment systems, from which they are added
to navigable waters municipal outfalls, a large part of this
atypical universe. These “indirect” industrial dischargers
are not required to have §402 permits,8 but are directly
regulated by technology-based effluent limitations for toxic
pollutants and other limitations designed to prevent interference with the municipal treatment systems into which
they are discharged or from passing through those systems
untreated. The municipal treatment systems’ subsequent
addition of the indirect industrial dischargers’ treated pollutants to navigable waters is regulated by §402 permits
issued to the municipalities, because the municipal systems
are designed and intended to collect, treat, and discharge
these industrial wastes. Similarly, both municipal and
industrial stormwater systems are required under §402(p)
to have permits. That is not remarkable: But for the municipal street and storm sewer systems, polluted stormwater
would not be discharged to nearby streams; and but for
the industrial operations, polluted stormwater would not
be discharged to nearby streams.
However, there is an entirely different category of these
atypical cases, in which the pollutants passing through
point sources have no other relationship with the point
sources or their owners. The following hypothetical illustrates these cases. Water from a spring on A’s property
flows into a river adjoining that property. A maintains a
farm road bordering the river. Because land at the intersection of the spring flow and the river becomes muddy
and obstructs the passage of vehicles, A installs a culvert
for the spring flow to the river, and elevates the farm road
to pass over the culvert. Unknown to A, B is upset with
C, his former girlfriend, and her family because she will
no longer see him. C and her family live on the river,
just downstream from A’s property, and use it as their
water supply. In revenge for C’s renunciation of him, B
pours several buckets of a deadly poison into the spring
water just before it passes through the culvert, so that the
poison enters the river through the culvert, flows into C’s
water supply, and kills C and her family. Who would the
prosecutor charge with homicide, A or B? Of course, she
would charge B because B is the actor intending and acting to cause the deaths. Would the prosecutor charge A,
because of the role that his culvert played in the action?
Of course not. She would not charge A because he did
not act toward C and his culvert was not a but-for cause
of the deaths. If A had never installed the culvert and B
had poured poison in the spring flow, the same deaths
would have occurred.
In the above hypothetical, who would the prosecutor
charge with the crime of water pollution, A or B? Should
she charge A, because A owned and operated the point
source from which the pollutants flowed into the river
and the owner or operator of a point source may add pollutants to rivers from a point source only in compliance
8.	

See 40 C.F.R. §122.2, which defines “discharge of a pollutant” not to include additions from “indirect sources,” which it, in turn, defines as sources
adding nondomestic waste to municipal sewage treatment plants.
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with a CWA permit? No, because A did not act toward
the river with regard to the pollutants and was not a
but-for cause of their entry into the river. If A had never
installed the culvert and B had poured pollutants into
the spring, the same pollutants would have entered the
river. A would have had no reason to know he should
apply for a CWA permit to add pollutants to the river.
On the other hand, B acted toward the river with regard
to the pollutants, B was the but-for cause of the pollutants entering the river, and B had every reason to know
that he should apply for a CWA permit to add pollutants
to the river. B, not A or A’s point source, is the “any person” who violated CWA §301(a); B added pollutants to
the river from a point source. (Of course, if A installed
the culvert knowing that B’s poison would enter the river
more quickly and more completely, A would be complicit
with B’s offenses.9)
Courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court,10 have generally rejected the “passive point source” owner defense,
but only in cases in which the point source owner was not
truly passive and without considering the above hypothetical or situations like it. Many decisions interpret “addition” broadly enough to convict the culvert owner in the
above hypothetical, even though treating him as a §301(a)
violator makes no sense and may even raise constitutional
issues.11 The point source owner in the hypothetical, however, is defended by recognizing that under §301(a), a person must act to add pollutants to navigable water from a
point source. In the typical cases and most of the atypical
cases, the point source owners are not really passive, they
act to add pollutants to water where the pollutants would
not otherwise be; but for their actions, the pollutants would
not be in the water.12 In our hypothetical, however, A is a
purely passive point source owner and is not a but-for cause
of adding poison to the river. If the culvert had not existed,
the poisons would still have entered the river and killed C
and her family. B is the only but-for cause of the pollutants
entering the river and the resulting deaths, and B added
pollutants to navigable water from a point source, even if
he did not own the point source.
9.	

Violations of the CWA are criminal felonies if they are knowing, criminal
misdemeanors if they are negligent, and may be civil offenses with no fault.
§309(c), 33 U.S.C. §1319.
10. In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95, 105, 34 ELR 20021 (2004), the Court held that the passive
point source defense was “untenable.”
11. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc. 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010), in
which the court treated lack of causation and of mens rea as raising similar
constitutional issues. See also the helpful note by Alex Arensberg, Are Migratory Birds Extending Environmental Criminal Liability, 38 Ecology L.Q.
427 (2011). Because §309(c) requires mens rea for criminal offenses and A
in our hypothetical has no level of mens rea, the constitutionality of criminal prosecution for a CWA offense without causation is unlikely to be an
issue. However, because civil liability under §309(a) or (b) is strict liability,
requiring no mens rea, a civil prosecution against A for violating §301(c)
without an act by A causing the violation is possible.
12. In South Florida Water Management District, 541 U.S. 95, for instance, the
defendant pumped polluted donor water into unpolluted receiving water
and hence was a but-for cause of adding pollutants to the receiving water.
If the defendant had not acted, the pollutants would not have reached the
receiving water.
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In the absence of a statutory or regulatory definition
of “addition” or controlling precedent, courts “are left to
construe it ‘in accordance with its ordinary or natural
meaning.’”13 Indeed, courts interpreting “addition” in the
CWA use plain meaning and precedent more frequently
than other interpretive devices.14 To determine the plain
meaning of a word, courts may consult a dictionary,15
although there is no unanimity which dictionary is preferred.16 A dictionary definition particularly helpful to
understanding “addition” in §301(a) is “the act . . . of adding something to something else,”17 which can be restated
as “the act of adding something (A) to something else (B),”
when (A) would not otherwise be in (B).” In the context
of §301(a), it would read: “the act of adding A (any pollutant) to B (navigable waters) from a point source,” when A
(that pollutant) would not otherwise be in B (those navigable waters).”
The working hypothesis of this Article is that “addition”
means “the act of a person adding a pollutant to navigable
waters from a point source, when that pollutant would
not otherwise be in those navigable waters.” Because the
author’s definition of “addition” focuses on addition by a
person rather than by a point source, it is possible for a
point source to convey pollutants to navigable water without adding them to it. This formulation of the definition
still covers most passive point source situations, but does
not include the passive owner in our hypothetical. This
formulation emphasizes the causal concept inherent in
the definition; addition does not happen spontaneously,
something must cause it.18 It also incorporates part of what
will be discussed below as part of EPA’s “outside world”
13. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 376 (2006),
quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
14. The author’s research has found that courts used each of the precedent and
plain-meaning canons of construction in 49 of the 61 decisions interpreting
“addition,” or 80%. Courts employed the next most commonly used canons
in only 19 decisions. Although courts predominantly used plain meaning to
interpret “addition” until 1983, after that date, they used plain meaning and
precedent almost equally.
15. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 275
(1987) (identifying one of the Chief Justice William Rehnquist Court’s
canons of statutory construction as “follow dictionary definitions of terms
unless Congress has provided a specific definition,” and noting that the dictionary should be “of the era in which the statute was enacted.” See also
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 415-24 (2012), for a detailed discussion of the nuances of
using dictionaries in determining the “plain meaning” of statutes.
16. According to Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, supra note 15, only a
“scholarly” or “weighty” dictionary will do, and they list several dictionaries
from different eras as possibilities. See Scalia & Garner at 415-24. They
also suggest using a dictionary contemporary with the use of the word being
interpreted, the year 1972 in the case of the CWA, or later because dictionaries’ definitions usually trail actual usage. Id. at 419.
17. See Oxford English Dictionary Online. Courts have consulted other dictionaries. For instance, in Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, 421 F.3d 1133,
1143 (10th Cir. 2005), the court referred to the definition of “addition” in
Webster’s New International Dictionary (2002): “the act or process of adding.” In Friends of the Everglades v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2006 WL
3635465 (S.D. Fla. 2006), the court referred to the definition in Webster’s
3rd International Dictionary Unabridged (1993): “joining of one thing to another.” See also S.D. Warren Co, 547 U.S. at 376, in which the Court looked
to the dictionary definition of “discharge” in Webster’s New International
Dictionary at 742 (2d ed. 1954).
18. The Eleventh Circuit recognized this in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla.
v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 1368-69, 32 ELR 20475
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theory of “addition.”19 This definition should yield appropriate results in the decisions examined below. EPA and the
courts should adopt it.

II.

Legislative and Administrative
Definitions of “Addition”

CWA §502, the general definitional section of the statute,
does not define “addition,” the statute does not define it
elsewhere, and there is no legislative history directly suggesting its meaning. Congress used “addition” in the CWA
only in §§301(a) and 502(12),20 except in the irrelevant
phrase “in addition to” or a variant.21 This should make
interpretation of “addition” easy in most cases, because
there is no congressional interference with the ordinary
meaning of this straightforward, almost mathematical
concept.22 And as we will see below, some cases are easy.
On the other hand, with no indication of what Congress
had in mind by using “addition,” beyond the word itself
and the purpose of the statute to control water pollution,
some “addition” decisions may not be easy. Indeed, some
are difficult, with courts almost resorting to metaphysics.23
The general definitional section of EPA’s §402 regulations, 40 C.F.R. §122.2, does not define “addition” either.
EPA’s few attempts to clarify the meaning of “addition” have
only muddied the waters. In its initial attempt in National

19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

(11th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
As discussed below in the Article, the Supreme Court rejected the remainder
of EPA’s “outside world” theory in Miccosukee. See 541 U.S. at 105.
Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1143 (10th Cir.
2005); Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York,
273 F.3d 481, 493 (2d Cir. 2001).
For example, §212(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. §1292(2)(B), “In addition to the definition contained in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, ‘treatment works’
means . . .” Section319(a)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. §1329(A)(1)(A), also provides
that “without additional action to control nonpoint sources . . . .” (Emphases added.)
The length to which Congress sometimes goes to interfere with straightforward scientific concepts is illustrated by its definition of “solid wastes”
as “solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material” in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k, ELR
Stat. RCRA §§1001-11011. See RCRA §1004(27), 42 U.S.C. §6903(27).
For instance, consider the idea that soil and vegetation withdrawn from a
wetland in a landclearing operation are metamorphosed into pollutants the
instant they are returned to the same wetland and that the pollutant is added
to the wetland because no pollutant was there before, even though the same
soil and vegetation were in the same wetland before and after the operation.
Borden Ranch v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 814, 32 ELR
20011 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335-36,
30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000). Consider also the bizarre idea that all the
disparate bodies of navigable water in the country are one and therefore
channeling a heavily polluted navigable water into a pristine navigable water
adds no pollutants to the pristine water because the polluted water and the
pristine water are the same navigable water. Catskill Mountain Chapter of
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
Equally metaphysical is the notion that water withdrawn with live fish from
navigable water, run through a power plant to generate energy, and returned
as fish puree to the same navigable water body adds nothing to the navigable water because it never lost its status as navigable water, while water
withdrawn from same navigable water to cool the same power plant and
returned hot to the same navigable water body adds heat and fish puree to
the navigable water because the water lost its status as navigable water during its journey through the generator. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers
Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 589, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988).
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Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,24 EPA asserted that “addition from a point source occurs only if the point source
itself physically introduces a pollutant into water from the
outside world.”25 In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, the petitioner did not
introduce pollutants into water, but pumped an already
polluted water body into a less-polluted water body. The
petitioner argued from EPA’s “outside world” theory that
§402 permits are required only “‘when a pollutant originates from a point source,’ and not when pollutants originating elsewhere merely pass through the point source.”26
The Supreme Court decisively rejected this argument. “A
point source need not be the original source of the pollutant: it need only convey the pollutant to navigable water.”27
In doing so, however, the Court interpreted “point source”
rather than “addition.” This Article addresses the “outside
world” concept in several contexts in detail below, rejects
it in part, and questions the usefulness of the remainder.
EPA’s second attempt to clarify “addition” was in a
policy and later in the preambles to a proposed and final
rule exempting water transfers from the requirement of
obtaining §402 permits. While the rule does not mention
“addition,” the preambles state that EPA’s interpretation
of “addition” is the basis of the rule. However, on close
reading of the preambles, they did not define “addition,”
but instead interpreted the statute as a whole or interpreted
“addition” in conjunction with “navigable waters” to mean
all navigable waters as a unitary national entity, rather than
individual navigable water bodies as singular entities. The
Article addresses the policy and the rule in detail below and
concludes they are erroneous interpretations of the CWA.

III. Judicial and Administrative
Interpretations of “Addition”
As with most statutory interpretation, the meaning of
“addition” is uncontroversial in most cases. It is usually
fairly clear whether a person is adding pollutants to navigable water. You can often see a factory discharging discolored
or foaming water into a river, visually adding pollutants.
Indeed, most industrial and municipal dischargers admit
they are adding pollutants to navigable water, by applying
for CWA permits to do so. With that in mind, it is no surprise that the “addition” element is not contested in many
litigated cases.28 Even in decisions in which the “addition”
element is challenged, courts often summarily hold that an
addition has taken place.29
Most of these cases fall into three broad categories. The
first, and most numerous, are situations in which point
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
693 F.2d at 175.
541 U.S. 95, 104, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
541 U.S. at 105.
The author’s research has found that 61 decisions interpret “addition,” 68
interpret “pollutant,” 75 interpret “point source,” and 138 interpret “navigable waters.” Many of the decisions interpret more than one element.
29. In 14 of the 61 decisions considered in this Article, courts decided “addition” was or was not satisfied based solely on a recitation of either plain
meaning or precedent.
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source owner defendants claim they are not liable because
other persons add pollutants to water upstream from the
point sources, and the pollutants merely flow through
the defendants’ passive point sources. The second, and
least numerous, are situations in which the additions are
directly or indirectly to or from the air. The final category
consists of §404 cases involving additions in the process of
clearing wetlands.

A.

Passive Point Sources

Before examining the patterns in which defendants may
raise the passive point source defense, it is useful initially
to develop the concept of the discharge of pollutants and its
supporting vocabulary. A point source, for instance a pipe,
has two ends, one into which water enters and another
from which water is discharged. Water entering the pipe is
withdrawn from donor water and is referred to as influent.
Water discharged from the pipe flows through the point
source into the receiving water and is referred to as effluent.
The donor water may be non-navigable (for instance, stormwater runoff, isolated waters, or groundwater) or navigable
(the same navigable water body as the receiving water or a
different navigable water body). Passive point source owner
or operator defendants argue that they are liable only for
pollutants they add to water and that they are not liable for
pollutants added by other persons to donor water before it
reaches the defendants’ passive point sources. They argue
that those others are the but-for causes of adding the pollutants to the receiving water; without the addition of pollutants by others to the donor water, pollutants would not
enter the receiving navigable water. A significant flaw in
this argument is that there may be more than one but-for
cause of a violation.
Causation is an element of negligence and nuisance, the
common-law precedents of basic pollution control legislation, including the CWA.30 It might be assumed that causation has no place in pollution control legislation, because
it creates strict liability offenses.31 But strict liability at
common law means liability without fault or intent, not
liability without cause.32
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the passive point source defense in Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Florida v. South Florida Water Management District,33 based on lack of but-for causation. In Miccosukee, plaintiffs challenged the transfer through pumps
and pipes of a polluted navigable donor water into a lesspolluted navigable receiving water without a §402 permit.
Defendants argued they did not add the pollutants to the
less-polluted receiving water because others added them
30. Miller, supra note 6, at 11-48.
31. The CWA’s civil offenses are strict liability; they have no mens rea component. See §309(a) & (b); American Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, 412 F.3d
536, 540 (4th Cir. 2005). The CWA criminal offenses, however, are not
strict liability; the misdemeanor offense requires negligence, and the felony
offense requires knowledge. See §309(c).
32. Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts 959-61 (2011).
33. 570 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002).
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earlier to the more-polluted donor navigable water. The
court concluded:
When a point source changes the natural flow of a body
of water which contains pollutants and causes that water
to flow into another distinct body of navigable water into
which it would not have otherwise flowed, that point
source is the cause-in-fact of the discharge of pollutants.
And, because the pollutants would not have entered the
second body of water but for the change in flow caused by
the point source, an addition of pollutants from a point
source occurs.34

In other words, the point source owner defendant in this
case was not truly passive.
On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the
Supreme Court unanimously35 held that the passive point
source defense in that case was “untenable,” putting the
defense to rest, at least under the fact pattern at issue in
the case. However, the Court did not base its holding on
interpreting “addition,” as the Eleventh Circuit had, but
on interpreting “point source,” for the definition of that
element “makes it plain that a point source need not be
the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey
the pollutant to navigable waters.”36 The definition of point
source is a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.”
(Emphasis added.) The Court’s failure to address causation
was not a rejection of causation’s role in “addition,” because
the Court simply did not address the meaning of “addition.” The Eleventh Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s Miccosukee decisions will be discussed in greater detail below.
Owners of point sources accused of violating the CWA
have raised the passive owner defense when others initially introduced pollutants into donor water subsequently
flowing through defendants’ point sources into navigable
receiving water.37 These cases involved many fact patterns,
34. Id. at 1368-69. Courts commonly use but-for analysis to determine causation for tort purposes. See Dobbs et al., supra note 32 at §168. The
defendant’s action is the cause-in-fact of a harm if, but for the defendant’s
conduct, the harm would not have occurred. This necessarily requires a
comparison with what would have occurred if the defendant had not acted.
Id. at §§168-69. Of course, it is possible to have two defendants whose
actions both are but-for causes of a harm. Id. at §171. A but-for analysis
of the passive point source owner and the person adding pollutants to the
donor water will come to different results depending on the facts. If the
pollutant added to the donor water would have entered the receiving water
without the point source, the owner or operator of the point source is not
the but-for cause of the addition and is not liable, at least not under a butfor causation analysis. In either case, the person adding pollutants to the
donor water is a but-for cause of the addition of the pollutants to navigable
water from the point source, regardless of the liability of the owner or operator of the point source.
35. Although Justice Scalia dissented in part, he concurred with the majority on
the passive point source issue. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 112-13, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
36. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105. The Court’s second conclusion is that Congress clearly intended that sewage treatment plants (publically owned treatment works or POTWs) require §402 permits; POTWs “treat and discharge
pollutants added to water by others.”
37. Such cases arose under the Refuse Act, the predecessor of the CWA’s §402
program, and early in the enforcement of the CWA. In United States v.
Granite State Packing Co., 470 F.2d 303, 3 ELR 20074 (1st Cir. 1972),
the industrial defendant was liable under the Refuse Act for discharging its
waste into water that subsequently flowed through a municipally owned
culvert to navigable water. And in an early case under the CWA, United
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including runoff from abandoned mining operations,
other surface runoff, dam-induced changes in water quality, water recirculated in industrial activity, and transfers
of water between watersheds. The analyses in these cases
by EPA and the courts,38 however, fall into three other categories based on whether the pollutants: (1) are recirculated
within the same navigable water; (2) originate in nonnavigable stormwater runoff; or (3) are transferred from
one navigable water to another navigable water. Decisions
within these categories sometimes conflate the analysis of
two elements, “addition” and “navigable waters.” They also
routinely neglect to determine whether the defendants are
truly “passive” point source owners or whether they act in
some way to add pollutants to navigable water.

1.

Additions From Circulated or Recirculated
Water

In the decisions analyzed here, defendants withdrew polluted navigable donor water, used it, and then discharged
it through a point source to the same navigable receiving
water from which the donor water was diverted prior to
use. If the defendants did no more, under both EPA’s “outside world” theory and our suggested definition of “addition,” no permit is necessary.

a.

Net/Gross Rule

At the outset of the implementation of the §402 permit
program, EPA confronted the issue that many dischargers
of polluted effluent withdrew polluted influent from and
discharged polluted effluent to the same water body; some
of the pollutants in their effluents were already in the influent donor water when they withdrew it. The dischargers
were passive point source owners for pollutants already in
their influent water: other polluters or nature itself initially
introduced the pollutants to the donor water and therefore
were the but-for causes of the defendants’ point sources
adding those pollutants to the receiving water.
Thus, the question: Did the statute require point source
owners or operators to treat pollutants that other persons or
States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), the
industrial defendant was liable under the CWA for the discharge of its waste
into a municipally owned storm sewer that subsequently flowed through a
point source into navigable water. In both cases, the enforcement target was
the person initially adding pollutants to donor water, not the passive point
source owner. The results were not unexpected; similar results would have
occurred under negligence and nuisance law, the common-law antecedents
of modern pollution control statutes. See, e.g., Springer v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 510 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1975), in which Schlitz discharged brewing waste into a municipal sewage treatment plant, causing the plant to
discharge untreated waste into a river, injuring a downstream landowner’s
property. The court held that Schlitz could be liable in negligence if in the
exercise of reasonable care it could have anticipated that the treatment plant
could not adequately treat the brewery waste. We do not know enough
facts in these cases to determine whether the point source owner was also
a but-for cause of adding pollutants to the receiving water, i.e., whether it
discharged donor water into receiving water that the donor water would not
otherwise have entered.
38. Courts in these cases typically deferred to one degree or another to
EPA’s interpretation.
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nature itself caused to be in the donor water before the dischargers first withdrew influent from it, used the influent,
and then discharged it back to the same receiving water?
The point source owners were not the but-for causes of the
pollutants from the influent; the same pollutants would be
in the receiving water if the point source never existed.39
Industries challenged technology-based effluent standards
because they perceived EPA would apply them in permits
to require treatment of all pollutants in an industry’s discharge, including pollutants present in the water before the
industry withdrew it for use.40 Before courts dealt with the
issue, EPA proposed and thereafter adopted a regulation
allowing permit applicants to seek credit toward meeting
their permits’ effluent limitations for pollutants already
in their influents, the so-called net/gross regulation.41
It should be noted that EPA’s rule applies only when the
“intake water is drawn from the same body of water into
which the discharge is made,” excluding water transfers
later authorized by EPA’s water transfer rule.42
The net/gross rule is consistent with EPA’s concept that
“addition” must come from the “outside world.” When an
industry withdraws donor water from a navigable water
body and returns it after use to the same navigable receiving water, the pollutants already in the donor water prior
to the industrial use (1) already have been added to the
donor water by others or by nature and (2) are from the
same world as the receiving water, not from the “outside
world.” But the rule also flows from the causal aspect of
“addition” developed in this Article. If the industrial point
source owner had never withdrawn, used, and discharged
the water or had never even existed, the same pollutants
would still be in the same receiving water above and below
the location of the same point source. Under the Eleventh
Circuit’s analysis in Miccosukee, the point source owner in
this situation would not be liable because the point source
is not a but-for cause of adding these returned pollutants
to the navigable water. Although the Supreme Court did
not discuss causation in Miccosukee, its holding is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning. A counterargu39. The issue is more complicated in some circumstances. Industries often require clean water for their processes. For instance, the paper industry needs
color-free water to make white paper and commonly treats the water it withdraws to remove color before using the water in making paper. EPA uses
another example in the preamble to its water transfer rule, stating that a
drinking water treatment facility that removes solids from river water before delivering the water for consumer use would require a §402 permit
before returning the solids to the river. 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33705 (June 13,
2008). In both of these examples, the water treatment process adds chemicals to the water to remove the unwanted materials from it, i.e., adding alum
to remove solids by flocculation. The materials removed from the water are
thus mixed with new pollutants and cannot be returned to the water without adding the new pollutants that were not originally in the water. Even
with net/gross credits, dischargers must treat the new pollutants.
40. Query whether the issue was ripe for review in the effluent guidelines, which
were neutral on the issue. The issue only arose if and when EPA actually applied the effluent guidelines in permits in the manner feared by industry.
41. 40 C.F.R. §122.45(g). “Gross,” of course, represents all of the pollutants in
the effluent; “net” represents only those pollutants first introduced to water
by the discharger.
42. 40 C.F.R. §122.45(g)(4). EPA may waive this restriction if no degradation
of the receiving water will result. The restriction is inconsistent with EPA’s
treatment of water transfers, as will be discussed later in the Article.
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ment might be that when the industry withdraws influent
water, the water loses its navigable character, so that when
the industry later discharges its effluent with the pollutants
originally in the donor water to the navigable receiving
water, the pollutants are newly added to navigable water.43
This counterargument, however, is strained, while the
main argument is straightforward.
EPA’s net/gross regulation allows the permit writer to
grant credits toward a permit’s effluent limitations for the
types and amounts of pollutants in an industry’s intake
water as long as it discharges those pollutants back to
the same navigable water from which it withdrew them.
Under the suggested definition of “addition,” the industry
did not add the pollutants to navigable water; they were
already in the same navigable water and would have been
in it if the point source had not existed.44 The point source
owner was simply not the but-for cause of the pollutants’
presence in navigable water. Requiring an industry to
treat such pollutants would be beyond EPA’s statutory
authority because the industry did not add the pollutants
to the navigable water.

b.

Dams and Recirculation

A variant of the net/gross fact pattern arose when environmental advocates challenged EPA’s failure to include dams
in the §402 permit program and later challenged a pumpstorage hydroelectric project for discharging pollutants
without a permit.45 As in the net/gross effluent guidelines
challenges, dams and the pump-storage project withdrew
donor water from navigable water and discharged it to the
same navigable receiving water after use, thus recirculating the water. And as in the net/gross challenges, the substances discharged were in the donor water in some form
to begin with and hence the point sources were arguably
not the but-for causes of the pollutants being in the receiving water. But in these cases, the point source owners were
not truly passive as to the pollutants: the owners’ use of
43. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580,
589, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988). A similar metaphysical argument has
been made in §404 cases: dredging removes soil and vegetation from wetlands, that material becomes dredged spoil when removed from the wetland,
and dredged spoil is a pollutant. Therefore, when some of the removed material is replaced in the same wetlands, the defendant added a pollutant for
the first time and a §404 permit is required, even though the same material
was in the wetland before and after the defendant’s actions. See United States
v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000).
44. That is not entirely true on a molecule-by-molecule basis. The industry
cannot isolate the molecules of a pollutant in its intake water and simply
transfer them to the discharge water without treatment. Those molecules
mix with the molecules of the same pollutant added by the point source’s
operation and both are subject to whatever pollution-control technology
the industry uses. The net/gross credit works by allowing the point source
to subtract from total number of molecules of the pollutant its treatment
must remove the number of the molecules already in its intake water. Its
treatment will remove some intake molecules and some operation molecules
and it will discharge some intake molecules and some operation molecules.
Since the molecules are fungible, as long as both sets of molecules are treated
effectively, the receiving water will not know the difference.
45. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (the dams case); Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (the pumpstorage project case).
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the water changed the character of the pollutants in environmentally detrimental manners. The changes the owners
made in the pollutants were not merely metaphorical, but
were observable, physical changes.
In Gorsuch,46 environmental advocates challenged EPA’s
failure to regulate discharges from dams in the §402
permit program. They contended that dams were point
sources that added dam-induced pollutants into downstream waters. The issue of whether dams are point sources
was not argued; EPA admitted that under some circumstances, dams are point sources.47 The pollutants identified
by plaintiffs included low dissolved oxygen (DO) caused
by impoundments,48 high DO caused by water cascading over dam spillways,49 temperature changes caused by
impoundments,50 suspended solids caused by algae growth
in impoundments,51 and similar material. The court held
that what the petitioner characterized as pollutants were
not pollutants, but merely changes in water quality.52 This
will be discussed further in the Article on “pollutant.”53
In the alternative, the court held that if the materials were
pollutants, the dams did not add pollutants to the downstream water.
The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) argued that
dams created the impoundments, that pollutants were
formed in and because of the impoundments, and that the
dam then added the pollutants from the impoundments
to the waters below. This amounts to arguing that dams
are the but-for causes of the pollutant in their ultimate
46. 693 F.2d 156.
47. 693 F.2d at 165.
48. Fish need high dissolved oxygen (DO). DO diminishes in quiescent water
in an impoundment, particularly in deeper water. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at
161-62.
49. Too much DO, i.e., super saturation, can cause trauma in fish associated
with oxygen bubbles in the blood stream. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 164.
50. Shallow impoundments with high surface-to-volume ratios tend to raise water temperatures, particularly at the surface. Deep impoundments with low
surface-to-volume ratios tend to lower temperatures, particularly in deeper
levels. Different aquatic species thrive at different temperature levels: trout,
for instance, like lower temperatures and bass like higher temperatures.
Higher temperatures also promote algae growth. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at
163.
51. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 164.
52. Id. at 171-74.
53. In an earlier, little-cited district court decision to the contrary, South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 8 ELR 20757 (D.S.C.
1978), environmental groups sued to halt the construction of one dam
and the continued operations of two other dams because they discharged
pollutants without §402 permits. Plaintiffs argued that water entering the
impoundments behind the dams was or would be high in DO and low in
metallic substances, whereas water released by the dams was or would be low
in DO and high in metallic substances, both changes were caused by the impoundments behind the dams and both were detrimental to fish. The court
agreed, “[h]igh quality water . . . will enter the facility . . . and low quality
water . . . will be discharged. Thus the release of the water changed because
of the impoundment constitutes the ‘addition’ of pollutants into a navigable
water.” 457 F. Supp. at 126. At least as to the change from high to low DO,
the court was wrong; DO is depleted by, not added in, the reservoir. The
court responded that low DO is pollution as defined in §502(19) and that
“no reasonable purpose would be served by admitting pollution while denying the existence of a pollutant.” While the argument has intuitive appeal, it
ignores the fact that §301(a) makes it illegal to add unpermitted pollutants,
not to create pollution, and that Congress decoupled “pollutant” and “pollution” in the CWA. At least under these sections, pollutants need not cause
pollution. EPA was not a party to this case, and it does not appear that its
“outside world” gloss of “addition” was before the court.
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form. EPA argued for the first time that “addition from
a point source occurs only if the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into the water from the outside world.”54 Because most dam-caused pollutants were
already in the reservoir water in some form before they
flowed over or through the dam, EPA argued those pollutants were not added to downstream waters by the dam, but
merely flowed over or through the dam.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(D.C.) Circuit found that nothing in the statute’s wording, structure, or legislative history directly addressed the
“addition” issue. It concluded that because both NWF’s
and EPA’s interpretations were reasonable, it was bound to
defer to EPA’s interpretation of the statute to a degree that
would later become known as Chevron deference.55 EPA’s
interpretation, however, was enunciated only in its litigation position in that and earlier cases and therefore was not
entitled to what would come to be a Chevron level of deference.56 Courts later rejected the D.C. Circuit’s excessive
deference, appropriate only if EPA’s interpretation had been
“adopted in a rulemaking or other formal proceeding,”57
which it was not.
In National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power
Co.,58 the environmental group sued a pump-storage project for withdrawing water containing live fish from Lake
Michigan; pumping it to a hilltop reservoir at night; releasing it during the day to run by gravity through a turbine
to generate both electricity and coincidentally fish puree;
and ultimately discharging it with fish puree, fish parts,
and some surviving fish back into Lake Michigan. Because
electricity is cheaper at night, when the company used it
to pump water uphill, and more expensive during the day,
when the company generated it by letting the water flow
downhill through the turbine by force of gravity, the operation was profitable, producing energy when it was most
needed and therefore most expensive.59
Acknowledging that the dead fish parts were pollutants,
the outfall pipe was a point source, and Lake Michigan was
navigable water, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the defendant did not violate the CWA
because it did not add pollutants to Lake Michigan: The
fish parts were not from the “outside world,” but instead
originated as whole fish in Lake Michigan waters. The key
to the court’s reasoning was its proposition that the “water
passing through the . . . facility never loses its status as
water of the United States”60 or, in the words of the district
court, “the Lake water does not lose its status as navigable
water simply because it is removed from the Lake, and
54. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175.
55. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 857, 14 ELR
20507 (1984).
56. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
57. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
273 F.2d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2001).
58. 862 F.2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988).
59. This explains why the operation was profitable, even though it requires more
energy to pump water uphill than it generates by flowing downhill through
the turbine.
60. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 589.
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since the fish never leave the Lake, they cannot be added to
it from the outside world.”61 Although there was Supreme
Court precedent (in another context) for the first part of
this proposition, the court cited no authority for it.62 It
took pains to explain that in normal industrial use, including industrial cooling, water loses its status as navigable
somewhere between the industry’s withdrawal of influent
from the donor water, the industry’s use of the water in the
industrial process, and the industry’s discharge of the effluent back into the same receiving water.63 If not, of course,
the CWA would prevent little or no pollution. Thus, under
the court’s analysis, when a power company withdraws
water from Lake Michigan to turn a turbine, the water
remains navigable while it is used and returned to the lake,
but if the same or a different power company withdraws
the same water from the same lake to cool a turbine, even
the same turbine, the water is no longer navigable when it
is returned to the same lake. EPA reiterated this distinction in the preamble to its water transfer rule.64 Neither the
court nor EPA cited authority or explained the rationale
for this difference. Despite revisiting the analysis annually
for decades, this author is unable to explain it either, except
as a results-oriented distinction or administrative and judicial metaphysics.65
The probable reason the court did not cite Supreme
Court precedent for its proposition that the water the
defendant diverted for power generation did not lose its
status as water of the United States was that the precedent did not support the court’s distinction between the
status of water diverted for power generation and water
diverted for other industrial uses. The court did not need
this unexplained and probably unexplainable distinction to support its ruling, however. It could, for instance,
have held the defendant’s pump storage operation did not
require a §402 permit because the change from live to
dead fish occasioned by the defendant’s operation was a
change in water condition, not the addition of a new pollutant, relying on Gorsuch.
61. Id. at 589, citing National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F.
Supp. 989, 1008, 17 ELR 20801 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
62. “[T]hat the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is unconceivable.” United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913); cited with approval in S.D. Warren Co.
v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 379, n.5 (2006) (stating “nor
can we agree that one can denationalize waters by exerting private control
over them”). Both decisions involved water diverted to generate electric
power. Neither, however, considered the particular type of diversion or the
issue discussed here.
63. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 589.
64. 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33704 (June 13, 2008).
65. There are some differences. In the cooling-water situation, the power plant
adds heat to the water in the pipes, while in the electricity-generation situation the plant does not add fish. But this difference relates to the “addition”
element, not the “navigable waters” element. It does not explain why the
water in the plant is non-navigable in the first case but navigable in the
second. In the cooling-water situation, §316(b) requires that the location,
design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures minimize adverse effects on the environment, while it requires no such location,
design, construction, or capacity requirement for non-cooling water intake
structures. But again, this has nothing to do with whether these waters are
navigable. Another possible distinction is that in Consumers Power, the water
is used to generate electricity, while in the other cases, it is used for industrial
purposes. But generation of electricity is an industrial process.
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As in the net/gross situation, these point source owners
and operators appear not to have added pollutants from
their influents to the navigable receiving waters, because
the donor water and the receiving water were the same
body of navigable water and the pollutants were already
in the donor water when the industry withdrew it. At the
same time, they differed from the passive dischargers in
the net/gross situation, for these point sources were not
truly passive; they manipulated material or characteristics
already in the influent water to make them different and
more harmful to the aquatic biota when discharged to the
receiving waters. But for their actions, the point sources
would not have created, discharged, or added to navigable
water fish parts, low DO, or higher concentrations of suspended solids; those substances would not otherwise be in
the navigable receiving water. Whether there is an addition
under either the suggested definition of “addition” or EPA’s
“outside world” theory, therefore, depends on whether the
pollutants already in the donor water are the same pollutants that the point sources added to the receiving waters
and whether they are pollutants at all, rather than water
conditions. That is determined by the meaning of “pollutant” rather than by the meaning of “addition.”

c.

EPA’s “Outside World” Theory of
Addition

EPA’s theory that addition “occurs only if the point source
itself physically introduces a pollutant into the water from
the outside world” first surfaced in the early 1980s as EPA’s
litigation position in Gorsuch.66 Although EPA cited no
statutory or other basis for it, the theory sounds logical.
The “outside world” is such a nicely turned phrase that it
lodges in our minds, a good example of a legal meme.67 It
is no surprise that the theory is frequently cited and seldom
questioned. Like many nicely turned phrases, however, it is
more pleasing than precise.
Examined closely, the theory incorporates two ideas.
First, the point source in question must itself introduce
the pollutant into water. Second, the pollutant must originate from the “outside world.” The first idea, that the point
source itself must introduce the pollutant into “the water,”
conflates the “addition” and “point source” elements of
the CWA offense. Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected
it in Miccosukee as contrary to the statute’s definition of
“point source” as a conveyance: “[A] point source need
not be the original source of the pollutant: it need only
convey the pollutant to navigable water.”68 Significantly,
the United States agreed with the Court.69 The mining
66. 693 F.2d 156, 175, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
67. Memes are contagious phrases, tunes, and other ideas that leap into our
minds and propagate by leaping from them into the minds of others. The
author explored “navigable water” as a meme in Jeffrey G. Miller, Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 Pace L. Rev.
409, 419-20 (2000).
68. South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95, 105, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
69. Id. at 105-06.
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waste decisions, discussed below, also implicitly reject the
first concept.
The second idea is also ambiguous. What does EPA’s
phrase “into the water from the outside world” mean? It
is not clear what “the water” in EPA’s phrase refers to. Is it
the donor water, the receiving water, either, any navigable
water or any water? The world outside “the water” will be
different depending on which “water” is considered. In
any event, could it make sense for the addition to be from
the “inside world?” On the other hand, if the origin of the
pollutant in an “addition” is inherently from the “outside
world,” the phrase adds nothing to the definition of “addition.” No doubt EPA could develop this concept to be a
meaningful part of a full definition of “addition,” but EPA
has not attempted to define the word.
Moreover, the “outside world” idea plays havoc with
the CWA’s second permit program, §404, which protects
the loss of wetlands from unregulated filling. Most of the
reported §404 decisions involve landclearing activities to
prepare wetlands for agricultural or other uses, activities
in which soil and organic material is moved from one location to another in a wetland. It is not apparent how this
material is from the world outside the wetland. EPA sidesteps the issue by observing that Congress defined “pollutant” to include “dredged spoil,” knowing that it was
removed from water, thereby sanctioning the application
of §404 to wetlands landclearing cases. While this establishes one of the four elements of the offense, “pollutant,”
it does not establish the other three, including “addition.”
If “addition” includes the “outside world” concept, it is difficult to square it with most §404 cases, unless “outside
world” applies to §402 cases, but not to §404 cases, which
EPA has not argued and which would be contrary to the
canon of statutory construction that words be interpreted
the same throughout a statute, unless the statute explicitly
indicates otherwise. The incompatibility of EPA’s “outside
world” theory of “addition” and §404 is explored in greater
detail below.
EPA’s “outside world” theory of “addition” is ambiguous, unhelpful, inconsistent with §404, and contrary to
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miccosukee. Yet, as discussed below, EPA has continued to use it, as if Miccosukee had never been decided. It is time that EPA either
abandons the theory or builds it to promulgate a complete definition of “addition.” If EPA does not act in one
of these manners, courts should recognize that the theory
is without merit.

2.
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ated with industrial activity” or discharged from “municipal separate storm sewer system[s].”70 EPA’s implementing
regulations included an amendment to its definition of
“discharge of a pollutant,” specifying that the “definition
includes additions of pollutants into waters of the United
States from: surface runoff which is collected or channeled
by man.”71 And in its stormwater regulations, it defined
“discharge associated with industrial activity” to mean “the
discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting
and conveying storm water and that is directly related to
manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas
at an industrial plant.”72
The “composed entirely of stormwater” wording of
§402(p) is curious. If there were no pollutants in the
stormwater, there would be no reason to regulate the discharges. Indeed, if there were no pollutants in the stormwater, adding it to navigable water from point sources
would not violate the prohibition of §301(a). If the point
source owner could prove the water from these sources
carried no pollutants, it would require no permit. EPA’s
reference to “additions of pollutants . . . from stormwater runoff” in its definition of “discharge of a pollutant”
acknowledges this.
The most commonly litigated fact pattern in decisions
on “addition” of pollutants from stormwater contamination involves mining operations, often inactive mining
operations. For example, in American Mining Congress v.
U.S. EPA, the plaintiff broadly challenged EPA’s interpretation of the statutory phrase “discharge associated with
industrial activity” in §402(p) as it applied to inactive
mining operations.73 The plaintiff argued that because
there is no “activity” at an inactive mine, EPA’s definition exceeded its statutory authority. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that EPA’s reliance
on “associated with“ in the statutory phrase “associated
with industrial activity” was reasonable, however, since
nothing in that statutory phrase required temporal concurrence between the mining activity and the polluted
stormwater discharge.74 Finding no legislative history and
nothing in the statute to the contrary, the court deferred
to EPA’s interpretation.
Courts have universally rejected the passive owner
defense when raised by owners and operators of point
sources discharging pollutants in stormwater runoff
from past, present, or neighboring mining operations.
In these situations, courts have held that “addition”
does not require the owner or operator of the point

Additions From Stormwater Runoff

Although there was considerable skirmishing at the outset
of the CWA’s implementation over whether surface stormwater runoff was subject to the §402 permit program,
Congress ended much of the contention by amending the
CWA in 1987 to include §402(p). In that subsection, Congress directed EPA to issue or deny permits “for discharges
composed entirely of stormwater” that are either “associ-

70. Municipal separate storm sewers carry only stormwater, not sewage, while
municipal combined sewers carry both stormwater and sewage.
71. 40 C.F.R. §122.2.
72. 40 C.F.R. §122.26(b)(14).
73. 965 F.2d 759, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir. 1992).
74. Id. at 764. A similar attempt to require temporal concurrence between “addition” and the polluting activity was rejected in National Cotton Council of
America v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009).
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source to generate,75 cause,76 create,77 or be the source78
or origin79 of the pollutant, but requires only that the
point source convey the pollutant to navigable water.
These decisions are entirely consistent with the Supreme
Court’s holding in Miccosukee that the passive owner
defense is “untenable.”80
The most thorough analysis of the issue regarding mining wastes is in Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc.81
There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
noted that in the definition of “discharge of a pollutant”
in §502(12), Congress modified “addition” with “any,”
suggesting an expansive reading of “addition,” and that
“viewed as a whole . . . the liability and permitting sections of the Act focus on the point of discharge, not the
underlying conduct that led to the discharge.”82 It also
notes that the CWA “refers to the obligations of the ‘owners and operators’ of a point source, suggesting that [they]
. . . are responsible for a functional point source”83 and that
EPA’s regulations “focus . . . on ownership of the point
source, not the discharge-causing conduct.”84 EPA defines
“owner or operator” as the regulated “facility or activity”
and defines “facility or activity” as a “‘point source’ or any
other [regulated] facility or activity.”85 The decision also
cited relevant precedent from the Ninth Circuit,86 as well
as EPA’s stormwater runoff regulations,87 to which it gave
deference. Other mining decisions have rejected arguments
that addition required intentional conduct88 or a greater
75. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880,
900, 41 ELR 20109 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control
Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 133 S. Ct. 710, 43 ELR 20004 (2013).
76. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 624 F.3d 159, 16768, 40 ELR 20014 (4th Cir. 2010).
77. Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 493 (2d Cir. 2001).
78. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280
F.3d 1364, 1368 n.6, 32 ELR 20475 (11th Cir. 2002).
79. United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 979, 23 ELR 20466 (4th Cir. 1992).
80. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
34 ELR 20021 (2004).
81. 421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005). See also the district court opinion, 2002
WL 33932715 (D. Colo. Nov. 15, 2002), which covered much of the
same ground.
82. Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d at 1143, citing §§301(e),
402(a)(1), and 101(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. §§1311(e), 1342(a)(1), and 1251(a)
(3). This is perhaps somewhat simplistic, as illustrated by industrial discharges into municipal sewerage systems. The municipalities must secure
§402 permits for their discharges of treated effluent into navigable water,
and the industries are not required to secure §402 permits for their discharges into the municipal sewerage system; the industries are indirect discharges
to the navigable water, 40 C.F.R. §122.3(b). But the industries are required
to treat their wastes before discharging them to the municipal sewerage system to meet pretreatment requirements established under §307(b) and are
civilly and criminally liable for not doing so under §309(a) & (c).
83. 421 F.3d at 1143-44, citing §§301(g)(2) and 308(a), 33 U.S.C. §§1311(a)
(2) and 1318(a)(2).
84. 421 F.3d at 1144, citing 40 C.F.R. §122.2 (definition of “addition of any
pollutant”) and §122.26(b)(14)(iii).
85. 40 C.F.R. §122.2.
86. Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d
305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1993); American Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965
F.2d 759, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir. 1992); Beartooth Alliance v. Crown
Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995).
87. 40 C.F.R. §122.26(b)(14)(iii) (active and inactive mining operations require stormwater runoff permits under §402(p)).
88. United States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir.
1979). Section §309(c) requires negligent conduct for misdemeanors and
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presence of pollutants after installation of the point source
than before,89 and that addition could not be of pollutants
already on the streambed or in the stream banks.90
A few passive point source decisions have involved the
collection and channeling of non-mining-related stormwater runoff.91 They reached the same conclusions as the
mining-related stormwater runoff cases, for the same reasons, especially the explicit coverage of stormwater runoff
by Congress92 and EPA’s corresponding regulations.93
The mining waste decisions implicitly reject the first
concept in EPA’s “outside world” gloss on “addition.” They
held, as did the Supreme Court in Miccosukee, that point
sources added pollutants to navigable water, even though
the point sources did not introduce the pollutants into
water in the first instance. Are the decisions consistent
with the more-developed concept of “adding a pollutant to
navigable waters from a point source when that pollutant
would not otherwise be in those navigable waters?” Did
the point sources cause the pollutants to be present in the
receiving water? We can not be sure, because the courts
did not undertake the factual analyses necessary to address
those questions. It is probable that without the channeling systems and their associated point sources, some of the
same pollutants in the same runoff from the same mining
operations would have made their way by force of gravity to the same receiving waters. The point sources would
not be but-for causes of adding these pollutants to these
navigable waters; the pollutants would have made their
way into these navigable receiving waters without the point
sources. Of course, absent channeling systems and associated point sources, it is also probable that some of the same
pollutants in the same runoff from the same mining operations would have percolated into the ground, evaporated
into the atmosphere, or reached another surface water. The
point sources would be but-for causes of adding these pollutants to these navigable receiving waters; these pollutants
would not have made their way into these navigable receiving waters without the point sources.
In many of these cases, the owners of the point sources
existed and were available as defendants, while the persons responsible for the mining waste in the runoff passing through defendants’ point sources no longer existed.
Thus, if anyone was responsible for violating the CWA, it
had to be the point source owners. Perhaps, in their zeal

89.
90.
91.

92.
93.

knowing conduct for felonies, and knowing conduct means knowledge of
facts, not law.
Committee to Save Mokelumne River, 13 F.3d 305.
Rybachek v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 20 ELR 20973 (9th
Cir. 1990).
Natural Res. Def. Council v. County of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880, 41 ELR
20109 (9th Cir. 2011) (city liable for discharging pollutants from its storm
drains into navigable water, even though others had placed pollutants in the
stormwater), aff’d, Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 133 S. Ct. 710, 43 ELR 20004 (2013); Environmental Prot.
Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(stormwater from silvacultural activity requires a §402 permit, even though
point source causes no net increase in pollutants reaching stream).
Section 402(p), 33 U.S.C. §1342(p).
Natural Res. Def. Council v. County of Los Angeles, 636 F.3d 1235 (9th
Cir. 2011). aff’d, Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 133 S. Ct. 710; Envtl.
Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803.
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to hold someone liable for violating the CWA, these decisions focused on the “point source” element of the offence
and ignored the “addition” element, with its causation
component. Thus, El Paso Gold Mines specifically avoided
discussion of causation. Such caution may be unnecessary
in most cases, however, because there can be two but-for
causes of a violation.
Under the second part of EPA’s “outside world” gloss on
“addition,” these decisions would be easy. The mining and
other materials were from the world outside the navigable
water and were therefore added by the point sources. But
EPA’s “outside world” theory begins with the concept that
the point source must originally place the mining wastes
into water.94 This is not the case in the mining waste decisions, however, because the mining wastes were in stormwater before it entered the point source; indeed, they were
in the stormwater before it entered the defendant’s property. The results are more complicated but accurate if we
use our sophisticated definition that “addition means the
act of a person adding something (A) to something else
(B) from a point source when (A) would not otherwise be
in (B).” The mining wastes (A) are certainly added to navigable water (B) from a point source, but would they otherwise be in navigable water (B)?
In the absence of fact-finding in the decisions on this
question, it is impossible to say with certainty. However, it
is most probable that some of the mining wastes would have
found their way by gravity and natural channels to navigable water without the point sources, and some would not
because they would have percolated into groundwater or
evaporated. As long as some of those wastes would not have
found their way to navigable waters on their own, the point
sources add at least those mining wastes to navigable waters.
That is enough to violate the statute and require a permit.

3.

Additions From Water Transfers

The final variant of the “passive point source” fact pattern
are transfers of water from one water body to another, specifically from more-polluted navigable donor water to lesspolluted navigable receiving water. Water transfers move
water from one watershed to another for a variety of uses,
of which agricultural irrigation and municipal water supply
are the most common. The owners of point sources introducing the transferred water to the receiving water may be
“passive,” in that they do not add pollutants to the donor
water being transferred. But they are active in that they
add more-polluted donor water to less-polluted receiving
water. EPA misleadingly claims it has consistently taken
the position that when donor navigable water is transferred
to other navigable receiving water, nothing is added to the
receiving water from the outside world because all navigable waters are one, the “unitary navigable waters” theory.95
94. That concept, however, has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105.
95. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.
95, 107, 34 ELR 20021 (2004). The Court points out that there is at least
one EPA General Counsel Opinion to the contrary. In Catskill Mountains
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EPA’s theory conflates meanings of “addition” and “navigable waters,” forcing this Article to consider “navigable
waters” as well as “addition” to understand and analyze
EPA’s theory. Until quite recently, every appeals court considering the issue has ruled against EPA’s position.96
After these decisions, EPA significantly changed the
legal landscape by promulgating its water transfer rule,
for the first time97 cloaking its interpretation of “addition” with Chevron deference.98 The one court of appeals
decision considering the issue after promulgation of the
rule cited Chevron deference to uphold EPA’s position.99
Petitions for judicial review of the rule in the circuit
courts were consolidated in the Eleventh Circuit, which
dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction.100 The Southern
District of New York subsequently heard a consolidated
challenge to the rule and in March 2014, vacated the rule
in Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v.
U.S. EPA (Catskill Mountains).101 This opinion is not only
the most recent decision on the issue, it is also by far the
most comprehensive in its analysis. Appeals, of course, are
sure to continue.

a.

Early Decisions

Prior to EPA’s promulgation of the water transfer rule,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Eleventh
Circuit all rejected EPA’s interpretation of “addition” to
exclude water transfers and EPA’s unitary navigable waters
theory. The First Circuit initially considered the issue in
Dubois v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,102 in which environmental plaintiffs challenged the U.S. Forest Service’s
approval of plans to expand a ski facility in a national forest. The plans included withdrawing polluted water from
the East Branch of the Pemigewasset River to make snow
and ultimately discharging the used water to the pristine
Loon Pond, without a §402 permit. The district court held
there would be no addition of pollutants to Loon Pond
because all navigable waters were a “singular entity.”103 The
district court also reasoned from the analogy of redistribv. U.S. EPA, 2014 WL 1284544 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014), EPA explained
that the outlier 1975 Opinion was overcome by a 1977 amendment to the
CWA. See also Agency Interpretation, infra note 131, at 2-3, n.5.
96. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
451 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2006); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. South
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 32 ELR 20475 (11th Cir. 2002);
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); and Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.2d
1273, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir. 1996).
97. 40 C.F.R. §122.3(i), 73 Fed. Reg. 33708 (June 13, 2008).
98. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
99. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210 (11th
Cir. 2009).
100. Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. EPA, 699 F.3d 1280, 42 ELR 20222 (11th
Cir. 2012). Federal appellate jurisdiction for judicial review of EPA actions
under the CWA is conferred in §509(b), 33 U.S.C. §1396(b), and the water
transfer rulemaking did not fall within any of the categories of actions for
which §509(b) granted jurisdiction.
101. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 2014
WL 1284544 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (Catskill Mountains).
102. 102 F.2d 1273, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 1296.
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uting water from the bottom of a pond to the top of the
pond, requiring no permit even if accomplished by a point
source. In reversing, the First Circuit rejected this analogy as ill-conceived, because redistribution of water within
the pond was redistribution within one water body, not
between two water bodies.104
The Second Circuit analyzed the issue of whether a
water transfer was an “addition” in greater depth in
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City
of New York (Catskill I).105 Environmental plaintiffs challenged New York City’s transfer without a §402 permit
of sediment-laden water from a reservoir in the Schoharie
River through the Shandaken Tunnel to Esopus Creek, a
well-known and clear trout stream (or at least once clear
below and still clear above the Shandaken Tunnel). The
transfer was part of the city’s water supply system, moving water it collected in the protected Catskill Mountains Watershed for use in the city. The Schoharie River
and Esopus Creek were connected in that they were both
part of the larger Hudson River Watershed, but until
they both entered the Hudson River, they were separate
watersheds, having no natural influence on each other.
The city argued, and the district court found, that there
was no addition of sediment from the Shandaken Tunnel to Esopus Creek, relying on Gorsuch and Consumers
Power. The Second Circuit rejected those precedents as
having “accorded unjustified deference to the EPA’s interpretation of ‘addition,’” because its interpretation was not
developed in a rulemaking or other formal administrative
process.106 The court also found that the decisions were
distinguishable on their facts: In both of the earlier decisions, navigable donor water was withdrawn from, used,
and returned to the same navigable water, essentially
a “recirculation of water” within the same water body,
whereas Catskill I involved transferring water between
different navigable watersheds.107
To explain Gorsuch and Consumers Power, the Second
Circuit used the analogy of taking “a ladle of soup from
a pot, lift[ing] it above the pot, and pour[ing] it back into
the pot,” adding nothing to the pot. If this was held to be
an “addition,” “EPA might as easily require a permit for
Niagara Falls.”108 But the court explained that the analogy
was not apt for the transfer between the Schoharie River
and the Esopus: “No one can reasonably argue that the
water in the Reservoir and the Esopus are in any sense the
104. The First Circuit also cited earlier decisions, but they did not deal directly
with water transfers. See Committee to Save the Mokalumne River v. East
Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1993) (overflow to stream from dam collecting polluted runoff from abandoned mining
area, where the runoff would have reached the stream without the dam);
Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991) (culvert was
a point source that added polluted waters from a landfill to nearby river);
United States v. M.C.C. of Fla., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th
Cir. 1985) (propeller of tugboat added bottom sediment to nearby sea grass
beds by stirring up the sediment).
105. 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
106. Id. at 489-91.
107. 273 F.3d at 491-92.
108. Id. at 491. Of course, Niagara Falls would not violate §301(a) because the
Falls is not a person.
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‘same,’ such that the ‘addition’ of one to the other is a logical impossibility.”109
The city then argued there was no “addition” in the case
under EPA’s “outside world” theory of addition because the
city’s point source did not initially introduce the pollutants
into water. The Second Circuit rejected that argument as
well: “The tunnel itself need not have created the pollution; it is enough that it conveys the pollutants from their
original source to the navigable water,” for point sources
are conveyers, not creators or originators, anticipating the
Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusion in Miccosukee.
The Second Circuit agreed with EPA’s interpretation that
for an “addition” to occur, “a point source must introduce the pollutant into navigable water from the outside
world,”110 but only if “that ‘outside world’ is construed as
any place outside the particular water body to which pollutants are introduced,”111 or, in our nomenclature, from
outside the receiving water. Using our understanding of
“addition,” the city added sediment to the Esopus from the
tunnel: but-for the tunnel, the sediments would not be in
the Esopus.
The court specifically rejected the “singular entity” or
“unitary navigable waters” theory that the addition of a
pollutant to one navigable water is an addition of that pollutant to all navigable waters, both as a matter of Second
Circuit precedent112 and as leading to an absurd result.
Concluding that the “transfer of water from a water body
contaminated with myriad pollutants to a pristine water
body containing few or no pollutants” is not an addition
would be “inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the
word ‘addition.’”113
Finally, the city argued that the legislative history and
the structure of the statute supported its interpretation of
“addition.” The court, however, found the legislative history to be “silent on the meaning of ‘addition.’”114 And the
court found that the city’s reliance on §101(g) (expressing
congressional policy that the authority of states to allocate water use was not abrogated by the CWA) was offset
by §101(a) (expressing congressional intent to restore and
maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters). The court
found transfers of polluted water to pristine water would
be inconsistent with §101(a). In the end, the Second Circuit found no reason to depart from the plain meaning
of “addition.”
The Eleventh Circuit considered the issue in even greater
depth in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. South
Florida Water Management District,115 in which the plaintiffs challenged the pumping of canal water contaminated
109. Id. at 492.
110. Id. at 491, quoting Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165. Contra Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at
105.
111. Id. at 491. This is in accord with the Supreme Court’s later ruling in
Miccosukee.
112. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir. 1991).
The facts in this decision may have amounted to a water transfer, but the
court did not analyze it as such.
113. Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 493.
114. Id.
115. 280 F.3d 1364, 32 ELR 20475 (11th Cir. 2002).
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with agricultural nutrients into less-polluted water flowing
to the Everglades, without a §402 permit. The Water Management District, like New York City in Catskill I, relied
on Gorsuch and Consumers Power, but the Eleventh Circuit rejected that reliance for the same reasons the Second
Circuit had rejected it.116 The Eleventh Circuit determined
that the appropriate water body for determining whether
a point source adds pollutants is the receiving water, not
the donor water.117 It then rejected the passive point source
argument, concluding that a point source need not be the
origin of pollutants to add them to navigable water. In
part, it used a dictionary definition of “from” to include
“by” stating that “no dispute exists on whether pollutants, in fact, are added to navigable waters . . . by a point
source . . . .”118 Finally, the court concluded that a point
source adds pollutants to a navigable water if the “point
source is the cause-in-fact of the release of pollutants” into
that receiving water.119 The point source, a pump, added
pollutants from the donor water to the Everglades-bound
receiving water “because the pollutants would not have
entered the second body of water but for the change in flow
caused by the point source, an addition of pollutants from
a point source.”120
In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida,121 the Supreme Court upheld
the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that “addition” did not
require that point sources generate the pollutants they
add to navigable waters. The Court underlined its rejection of the passive point source argument, describing the
argument as “untenable.”122 The Court, however, based its
ruling on the definition of “point source,” not on the definition of “addition.” The definition of “point source” as a
“conveyance,” “makes plain that a point source need not
be the original source of the pollutant: it need only convey
the pollutant to ‘navigable waters.’”123 But it remanded the
case for further factual findings on whether the donor and
receiving waters were “meaningfully distinct.”
The government argued as amicus that the inclusion of
“any” before three of the four elements of the offense of
water pollution, and its absence before the fourth, navigable water, “signals Congress’ understanding that NPDES
[national pollutant discharge elimination system] permits
116. Id. at 1367-68.
117. Id. at 1368.
118. Id. The court’s conversion of “from” to “by” in the offense is unnecessary; the
court’s “but-for” interpretation of “addition” is justification enough for its
conclusion. And it is also ill-advised, as there is already a “by” prepositional
phrase in the offense “by any person” in §301(a). A sentence with two “by”
prepositional phrases is awkward. Indeed, §502(12) uses “of,” “from,” and
“to” in its prepositional phrases, while only §301(a) uses “by” in its prepositional phrases, suggesting Congress used these prepositions advisedly.
119. Id. at 1368-69.
120. Id.
121. 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
122. Id. at 105.
123. Id. A secondary support for the Court’s conclusion was the intent of Congress to impose §402 permitting requirements on municipal sewage treatment plants, an intent that would be frustrated if POTW discharges were
exempt from permitting because the pollutants they discharged all originated from industrial and domestic discharges into the sewer system. Municipal sewage treatment plants are referred to as POTWs.
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would not be required for pollution caused by the engineered transfer of one ‘navigable water’ into another.”124 The
Court did not respond to this argument. But it did express
considerable skepticism of the “singular entity” theory, relabeled as the “unitary navigable water” theory.125 The government argued that §304(f)(F), directing EPA to develop
information on how state and local programs could address
“flow diversion facilities” as nonpoint sources, meant that
water transfers are nonpoint source pollution. The Court
noted, however, that §304(f)(F) did not “exempt nonpoint
pollution sources from the NPDES program if they also
fall within the ‘point source’ definition.”126
When the government argued that its long-standing
unitary navigable water interpretation should be accorded
deference, the Court noted that EPA’s interpretation of
“addition” had not been consistent and was inconsistent
with some of EPA’s own regulations, citing the net/gross
regulation.127 The government further argued that it would
be impractical for it to issue §402 permits for “every diversion of one navigable water into another,” because “thousands of new permits might have to be issued,” imposing
special problems in “western States, whose water supply
networks often rely on engineered transfers among various
natural water bodies.”128 The Court commented, however,
that such permitting might be necessary to protect water
quality; the administrative burden could be lessened by
issuing general rather than individual permits; and at least
one state had interpreted the CWA as requiring permits for
interbasin transfers.129 The Court might also have noted
that diversions of water do not require CWA permits and
that the discharge of irrigation return flow to navigable
water after diversion does not require CWA permits either,
considerably limiting the number of permits required.
The Court commented that treating all navigable water
as one would be inconsistent with the water quality standards program.130 The Court was correct in this regard, but
did not begin to understand how inconsistent the unitary
navigable water theory is with the water quality standards
program, an inconsistency this Article addresses in detail
below. Although the Court decided the passive point source
issue, it left open for the parties to argue the unitary navigable waters theory on remand. Because the Court neither
sustained nor rejected the unitary navigable waters theory,
it has been reargued in cases before the Second and Eleventh Circuits and district courts. In the meantime, EPA
124. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106.
125. Id. at 106-12.
126. Id. at 107.
127. Id. In the net/gross regulation, EPA established a process for granting dischargers credit for pollutants in their intake water, but only if they discharged to the same water body, an intrabasin transfer. As discussed above,
EPA’s restriction of net/gross credits to situations where the donor and receiving waters are the same is inconsistent with allowing interbasin water
transfers where the transferred water is polluted.
128. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108. The applicability of general permits for water
transfers is also explored, in somewhat more detail, in Chris Reagen, The
Water Transfer Rule: How an EPA Rule Threatens to Undermine the Clean
Water Act, 83 Colo. L. Rev. 307, 35-37 (2011).
129. 541 U.S. at 108-09.
130. 541 U.S. at 107.
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altered the legal landscape, first by issuing a detailed watertransfer interpretive statement and later by promulgating
a rule exempting water transfers from the requirement of
obtaining §402 permits.

b.

EPA’s Interpretive Memorandum and
Water Transfer Rule

EPA’s interpretation of the applicability of §402 to water
transfers (Agency Interpretation)131 and its subsequent proposed and final water transfer rule132 are considered here
together because they are virtually identical in content,
wording, and rationale, differing only in the more formal
structure and process of rulemaking and the greater deference due to a rule.133
After the Supreme Court’s Miccosukee decision, EPA
developed the Agency Interpretation, concluding that
Congress intended water transfers that “merely convey or
connect navigable waters,” uninterrupted by industrial,
municipal, or commercial use, be overseen by authorities
other than §402. Shortly thereafter, EPA published a proposed rule to add “[d]ischarges from a water transfer” to
the 40 C.F.R. §122.3 list of exclusions from the §402 permit program. Its proposed definition of “a water transfer”
was a conveyance “of water of the United States to another
water of the United States without subjecting the water to
intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use.”134
The preamble to the proposed rule explained its background and rationale by repeating the body of its Agency
Interpretation almost verbatim.135 Two years and 18,000
public comments later,136 EPA promulgated the water
transfer rule, with an accompanying preamble, virtually
unchanged from its earlier proposal.137
The first difficulty with the water transfer rule is to
determine exactly what legal issue it addresses, the starting point for judicial review. Several issues are possible.
First, on its face, the rule is a regulatory exemption for
water transfers from the requirement that all additions of
pollutants by point sources to navigable waters be in compliance with a permit. Both the wording of the regulation and its placement in a section listing such exemptions
leave little doubt that it is a regulatory exception. That
raises the legal issue of whether EPA has the authority
131. Memorandum From Gen’l Counsel Ann R. Klee, Agency Interpretation on
Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers (Aug. 5,
2005) [hereinafter Agency Interpretation], available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogc/documents/water_transfers.pdf.
132. 40 C.F.R. §122.3(i).
133. Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **34-35. While the three documents are virtually identical in their substantive content, the proposed and
final rules include sections required in promulgating regulations, but not in
establishing policy. For instance, the preamble to the final rule has a section
responding to comments made during the comment period after publication of the proposed rule.
134. NPDES Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32887, 32895 (June
7, 2006).
135. Compare Agency Interpretation, with proposed rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32887,
32888-92 (June 7, 2006).
136. Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *10.
137. NPDES Water Transfers Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697 (June 13, 2008),
codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.3(i).
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to promulgate such a regulatory exemption. On judicial
review, however, EPA insisted that the rule did not create
a regulatory exemption.138 At the outsets of the Agency
Interpretation, the preambles to the proposed and final
rule, and its argument on judicial review, EPA suggested a
second legal issue by stating that the precise legal question
at issue was whether water transfers are “additions” under
the CWA.139 EPA’s legal analysis in that context posits that
a “holistic” interpretation of the CWA leads to the conclusion that “addition” in the CWA does not include water
transfers.140 This is not a definition of “addition,” but a
statement of what is not an “addition,” divorced from the
meaning of the word.141
A third possible legal issue is interpreting “navigable
waters” to mean that all navigable waters are the same, the
unitary navigable waters theory. This flows from EPA’s use
of the theory to support its interpretation that transferring
pollutants from one navigable water to another navigable
water is not an “addition” of pollutants from the first navigable water to the second navigable water, because both
waters are the same.142 But the rule does not purport to
define either “addition” or “navigable water,” the rule is
not codified in the definitional section of the CWA regulations, and the definitions in that section do not incorporate
or suggest any of EPA’s concepts.143
What words in the statute, if any, does EPA’s rule interpret? Why is it so difficult to identify the legal question at
issue on judicial review? Is it because EPA is playing a shell
game, shuttling our attention from one statutory word
to another? The most straightforward approach to EPA’s
objective would be for it to define “navigable waters” or
“waters of the United States”144 to incorporate the unitary
navigable waters theory. EPA studiously avoided doing
138. Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **34-35.
139. See Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32887, 32889; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg.
33697, 33700; Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **14-15.
140. See Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32887, 32889; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg.
33697, 33701; Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **20-26.
141. In discussing the scope of its “interpretation” of “addition,” EPA wrote
that it “address[ed]” “addition.” Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at
18. (Addressing a term is much less than defining the term.) At the same
time, it expressly declared it was not “address[ing] the meaning of . . .
“navigable waters.”
142. The initial conflation of “addition” and “navigable waters” was in Consumers
Power: If live fish were in Lake Michigan waters when those waters were
diverted to generate electricity, the fish in those diverted waters were not
added to Lake Michigan when the diverted water was returned to the lake.
EPA asserted that position in subsequent litigation, the Agency Interpretation, and the preamble to the final rule.
143. The definitional section of the regulations is 40 C.F.R. §122.2, while the
exemption section in which the water transfer rule is located is 40 C.F.R.
§122.3. In its Agency Interpretation, EPA maintains it does not address the
meaning of “navigable waters,” and although it “addresses the meaning” of
“addition,” it does not define “addition.” How useful would it be for the dictionary to define “addition” as “an act that does not include water transfers”?
144. Section 502(7) defines “navigable waters” as the “waters of the United
States.” EPA does not define “navigable waters,” but instead defines “waters
of the United States” in 40 C.F.R. §122.2 and uses “waters of the United
States” throughout its §402 permit regulations instead of “navigable waters.” The Agency must have thought that parties to CWA disputes would
come to think only of “waters of the United States” when addressing CWA
jurisdiction, thus evading Commerce Clause restrictions on the scope of
“navigable waters.” If so, that sleight of hand did not work. See Catskill
Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544 at *5.
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so in the Agency Interpretation and the rulemaking,
although it could not avoid discussing the theory in those
documents.145 Indeed, it has recently proposed comprehensive amendments to its definition of “waters of the United
States” which make no mention of the theory.146 Why is
EPA so disinclined to interpret “navigable waters” to reach
the result it wants? Probably because the unitary navigable
waters concept is counterintuitive and the Supreme Court
has already seriously questioned the viability of the theory
under the CWA.147 Instead, EPA seems to have promulgated a rule exempting water transfers from the §402 permit program. But courts have long held that EPA does not
have authority to exempt additions of pollutants to navigable water from point sources from being in compliance
with permits148 and EPA admits that,149 leaving EPA no
alternative but to attempt an interpretation of “addition”
to exclude water transfers. However, the plain meaning
of “addition” simply does not suggest such an exemption.
That ultimately leaves EPA with its “holistic” interpretation of the statute to establish that Congress did not mean
§§301(a) and 502(12) to prohibit water transfers in the
absence of a permit, suggesting in turn that “addition” in
§§301(a) and 502(12) cannot include water transfers. EPA
is playing a shell game, but at least it’s understandable why
EPA is playing it. Of course, if EPA has to play shell games
to keep water transfers from requiring permits, the whole
enterprise is dubious.
The Agency Interpretation begins by outlining the
importance and pervasiveness of water transfers. It states,
for instance, that the U.S. Department of the Interior’s
145. EPA began each of the documents by describing the legal issue addressed as
“whether the movement of pollutants from one navigable water to another
navigable water by a water transfer is [an] addition” (emphasis added) or a
variant of that phrase. This admits of multiple bodies of navigable water,
not a unitary navigable water. See Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at
2; 71 Fed. Reg. 32887, 32889; and 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33699. But EPA
could not avoid describing and using its unitary navigable water theory. For
instance, in the Agency Interpretation, it quoted from the amicus brief of
the United States for the Supreme Court in Miccosukee, stating that the issue
in that case was “whether the pumping of water increased the sum of pollutants in the navigable waters as a whole, as opposed to the particular receiving water.” Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 13. In the preamble
to its final rule, EPA quoted at length from the U.S. brief in Friends of the
Everglades v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.: “Nothing is being added ‘to’ ‘the
waters of the United States’. . . by virtue of the water transfer, because the
pollutant at issue is already part of the ‘waters of the United States’ to begin
with.” See 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33701 (June 13, 2008).
146. Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79
Fed. Reg. 22188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014). EPA does note in the preamble
that it proposes “no change to the regulatory status of water transfers.” Id. at
22189. See also id. at 22203, stating that jurisdictional waters may include
“ditches that connect two or more ‘waters of the United States.’”
147. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95, at 106-12. EPA stated in its Agency Interpretation
that it developed its “holistic” theory because of the Court’s “concerns” with
the unitary navigable waters theory.
148. These decisions go back to Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d
1369, 8 ELR 20028 (D.C. Cir. 1977), regarding EPA’s attempt to create
regulatory exceptions to the CWA permit program in its first set of permit issuance regulations. See also Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. EPA,
537 F.2d 1006, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2008); Northern Plains Res. Council v.
Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003);
Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *14. See also dicta in Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318, 11 ELR 20406 (1981) (“Every point source
discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit.”).
149. Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *14.
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Bureau of Reclamation alone furnishes water to 140,000
western farmers through water transfers,150 implying that
as many permits might be required and farmers would
be adversely affected if transfers were considered additions. This largely is a bogus issue. Water diversions from
navigable water for agricultural use do not require §402
permits, because diversions take away from rather than
add to navigable water.151 As for the return to navigable
water of irrigation water after use, the statutory definition of “point source” excludes “agricultural stormwater
discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”152
This exclusion is reinforced by §402(l), prohibiting EPA
from requiring permits for “return flows from irrigated
agriculture.” The statutory exclusion and prohibition
remove most transfers of western irrigation water from
the requirement to obtain a §402 permit. Although EPA
demonstrates the importance of water transfers to agricultural and municipal water supply, particularly in the
West, it assumes but does not demonstrate that §402
thwarts water transfers. Indeed, EPA’s three documents
do not cite a single case in which §402 has blocked a
western water transfer. Ironically, if §402 does thwart
water transfers, EPA’s water transfer rule, reaching only
interbasin transfers, is less protective of transfers than
the statutory exclusion that reaches both interbasin and
intrabasin transfers of irrigation return flow. In any event,
EPA’s implicit suggestion that states are completely autonomous in the development of water resources is largely
rhetorical in that most sizable water resources projects are
federally funded; those 140,000 western farmers get their
water from Bureau of Reclamation water transfers, i.e.,
from federally funded public works.153
Water transfers are primarily, although not entirely,
western phenomena associated with irrigated agriculture
and municipal water supply. Indeed, western water law is
composed of highly developed state systems for allocating water use as a property right and approving transfers
of water between water basins.154 Although there was
some concern at the outset of the §402 program that
150. Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 3. EPA used the same information in the preambles to its proposed and final rule. See proposed rule, 71
Fed. Reg. 32887, 32889 (June 7, 2006); and final rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697,
33699 (June 13, 2008). The U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of
Reclamation operates only in the West.
151. Thus, for purposes of §401 state certifications, a diversion of water from a
river is not a discharge requiring a certification, because diversions are the
very opposite of discharges. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Washington
Dep’t of Energy, 511 U.S. 700, 776, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The majority did not disagree in that case, but held that §401
certifications were required for federal activities, not federal discharges.
152. Section 502(14). See also §402(l)(1). The exclusion appears to be more appropriate from “pollutant” than from “point source,” since stormwater, like
any water, is conveyed; it is not a conveyance.
153. See Reagen, Water Transfer Rule, supra note 128 at 320-35 (describing how
dependent western agriculture and municipal water supplies are on water
transfers). Like EPA, Reagen assumes that §402 permits would frustrate
them, but does not demonstrate that §402 permits have frustrated them.
Unlike EPA, he concludes that water transfers should be subject to §402
permits and that general permits may alleviate much of the burden on water
transfers of regulation under §402.
154. See generally A. Dan Tarlock et al., Water Resource Management (5th
ed. 2002).
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its implementation would conflict with state water use
allocation,155 such conflict has not proven to be of obviously great magnitude. None of the decisions interpreting “addition” or “navigable water” in water transfers
arose in a western state or a state adopting a western
use allocation scheme. None of the decisions involved
irrigated agriculture, probably because the exclusion of
irrigation return flow resolves most potential conflict
between the water quality and water quantity regimes.
No reported federal decision involves an actual conflict
between federal water quality requirements and state
water use allocation. Neither the Agency Interpretation
nor the preambles to the proposed or final rule identify
any such conflicts. EPA’s elaborate water transfer policy
construct is an incomplete cure for an undocumented
and perhaps theoretical problem.
Although EPA stated in the Agency Interpretation that
the precise legal issue was whether water transfers were
“additions,”156 neither that document nor the preambles
to the proposed or final rule defined “addition.” Indeed,
EPA never discussed the meaning of “addition” in those
documents, other than to reiterate its earlier description
of “addition” being “from the outside world.”157 Although
EPA mentioned §§301(a) and 502, it did not analyze their
applicability to the issue. It relied on the precedent of Gorsuch and Consumers Power, although neither supports the
Agency Interpretation or the rule and both have been discredited as persuasive precedent.158 Nor did EPA note the
Supreme Court’s rejection in Miccosukee of the first concept
of EPA’s “outside world” theory of “addition.”
Instead, EPA engaged in what it termed a “holistic”
analysis of the CWA to determine that Congress envisioned water transfers to be regulated by an unidentified
155. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-418 (1976), available at https://bulk.resource.org/
gao.gov/92-500/00006DA6.pdf. The Report to Congress of the National
Commission on Water Quality, submitted March 22, 1976, made no mention of conflicts between the CWA and state water resource management
use allocation. Congress established the Commission in §315, 33 U.S.C.
§1325, to study the implementation of the CWA and to suggest changes or
“mid-course corrections.” The more than 800-page-long Staff Draft Report
accompanying the Report to Congress devoted its last five pages to water resource management, noting that water quality and water quantity programs
were not as yet “completely compatible,” but citing no conflicts between the
CWA and a water transfer and making no recommendations to make the
programs more compatible.
156. Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 2.
157. Id. at 10. Moreover, EPA did not acknowledge that the Supreme Court had
rejected at least the first of the two components of EPA’s “outside world”
gloss on “addition” in Miccosukee.
158. Gorsuch and Consumers Power dealt with intrabasin transfers, while the
Agency Interpretation and rule deal with interbasin transfers and specifically exclude intrabasin transfers. Neither dams nor pump storage projects
come within the rule for the same reason. Consumers Power is also outside
the scope of the water transfer rule because the hydropower generation in
that case was an industrial use of water that occurred between the diversion
of the water from the lake and the return of the water to the lake, an intervening industrial use the rule excludes from the exemption. The Second and
Eleventh Circuits both rejected Gorsuch as precedent because it gave Chevron strength deference to EPA’s “outside world” interpretation of “addition”
when no such deference was due under United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001), insofar as it did not take place in a rulemaking or other
formal regulatory activity. See Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 491; Miccosukee, 280
F.3d at 1367-68 (11th Cir. 2002).
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federal or state authority other than §402.159 Although EPA
did not interpret the meaning of “navigable waters,”160 the
only way that pollutants in navigable donor water could
not be added to other navigable receiving water would be
if all navigable waters are one, the unitary navigable water
theory. The Agency Interpretation and preambles mention this, but EPA did not explicitly adopt it or incorporate it into the definition of either “addition” or “navigable
waters.” Indeed, EPA did not discuss the meaning of navigable water in the Agency Interpretation, the rule, or the
preambles. Moreover, EPA recently proposed a comprehensive amendment to its regulatory definition of “waters
of the United States,” without a hint that the definition
adopted the unitary waters theory.161 No wonder that the
Southern District of New York in Catskill Mountains had
great difficulty determining exactly which CWA terms
EPA claimed Chevron deference for interpreting.162
EPA’s self-described “holistic” approach is to interpret
particular parts of the CWA’s text, i.e., “addition,” in the
context of the entire statutory structure to avoid absurd
results.163 EPA concludes that the CWA, interpreted as a
whole, strikes a grand balance between federal water pollution control and state water use allocation. Looking at the
entire statute, EPA observes that the CWA has several programs to control pollution other than the §402 permit program, most notably the state-administered nonpoint source
program.164 It admits that the CWA contains no provision
specifically stating the §402 program covers or does not
cover water transfers. But it contends that §§101(b), 101(g),
304(f), and 510(2), taken together, establish a grand balance between federally directed water pollution control
and state-controlled water use allocation, including state
supervision of water transfers.165 EPA concludes that interpreting “addition” not to incorporate water transfers is consistent with this understanding.166
Interpreting a long and complex statute such as the
CWA as a seamless whole rather than a disjointed jumble
of sections is a positive goal167 and one for which EPA is
uniquely qualified. Despite EPA’s claim that its interpretation of “addition” to exclude water transfers is “holistic,”
EPA fails to establish it. First, neither the sections EPA
159. Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 4-8. See also Proposed Rule, 71
Fed. Reg. 32887, 32889 (June 7, 2006); Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697,
33701 (June 13, 2008).
160. Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 18 n.19.
161. Definition of “Waters of the United States,” supra note 146, 79 Fed. Reg.
22199 (proposed Apr. 12, 2014).
162. Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **14-15.
163. Although the Agency Interpretation and the preambles to both the proposed final rules cited the interpretive canon of avoiding absurd results,
none of them gave examples of absurd results from requiring water transfers
to obtain §402 permits. The Agency Interpretation quotes Natural Res. Def.
Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98, 32 ELR 20203 (2d Cir. 2001), to
the effect that the most helpful canons in interpreting the CWA are the
whole-statute canon and the avoid-absurd-results canon. The preambles to
the proposed and final Water Transfer Rule repeat this. See 71 Fed. Reg.
32887, 32889 (June 7, 2006); 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33701 (June 13, 2008).
164. Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 5.
165. Id. at 5-7.
166. Id. at 9.
167. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 324 (interpret a statutory section “by reference to the whole act”); Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 167-70.
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cited, the remainder of the statute, nor its legislative history explicitly establish any grand congressional design to
strike a balance between water quality and water quantity. Second, the four statutory provisions on which EPA
bases its interpretation provide, at best, ambiguous support
for the meanings EPA thrusts upon them. Third, while
EPA focuses on the three subsections and one paragraph
of the CWA,168 it ignores the remainder of the 200-page
statute, consisting of over 500 subsections and over 800
paragraphs, most of which are unambiguously focused on
promoting pollution control. Section 301, the locus of the
basic prohibition against the “discharge of any pollutant”
without a permit, alone has 16 subsections and 40 paragraphs. Claiming to interpret the statute as a whole to favor
state regulation of water transfers without regard to federal
concerns for water quality, based on weighing three short
and ambiguous subsections against over 500 subsections
and one short and ambiguous paragraph against over 800
paragraphs,169 does not establish a “holistic” view of the
statute. Finally, not only does EPA’s “holistic” interpretation ignore virtually all of the statute, it is in derogation
of one-half of the regulatory strategies and programs of
the statute: water quality standards, one of the CWA’s two
grand strategies for pollution control, and §404, one of the
CWA’s two permit programs for assuring water quality.
The initial sentence in the first of EPA’s four relied-upon
statutory provisions, §101(b), recites congressional policy
“to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and
water resources . . . .” This subsection does not mention
water transfers or the state allocation of rights to use water.
It certainly does not state that water quantity trumps water
quality. EPA may argue that it refers to western water rights
when it speaks of “the primary responsibilities and rights
of States . . . to plan the . . . use of . . . water resources,”
(emphasis added) for western water rights are allocated
by states for public and private use. But “to plan” is more
consistent with reference to the states’ roles in designating
uses as the initial step in establishing water quality standards under §303(c). The “to plan” in §101(b) also corresponds with the §303(3) requirement that states establish a
“continuing planning process” to assure that water quality
standards are attained and maintained. Allocation of water
rights requires authority well beyond planning, especially
when most water rights are based on a first-come first-use
basis,170 the very antithesis of planning.
The conclusion that the first sentence of the subsection
refers to the state role in establishing water quality standards is supported by the remainder of the subsection,
168. Provisions denoted by a lower-case letter are subsections and those denoted
by an Arabic number are paragraphs. Thus, §§101(b) & (g) are subsections,
while §510(2) is a paragraph (although paragraphs are normally indented
and that was not done in §510).
169. Since subsections incorporate the paragraphs, it may be simpler to refer to
four out of 525 subsections.
170. See Tarlock, supra note 154, at 154-58.
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which deals with federal and state roles in implementing
other portions of the CWA, its grant program for construction of publically owned treatment works, the §402
and §404 permit programs, and federal research, technical assistance, and financial aid programs for state, local,
and interstate agencies. This strongly suggests that the first
sentence also speaks to federal and state roles in a CWA
program, the water quality standards program, rather than
to ordering CWA goals and goals external to the CWA,
because none of the remainder of the subsection deals with
ordering CWA goals and external goals.
The second of the CWA subsections on which EPA
relies for its interpretation, §101(g), is the only one that
unambiguously deals with the intersection of water quality and water quantity. It states congressional policy “that
the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water
within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated
or otherwise impaired by this chapter.” The subsection was
added to the CWA in a 1977 Amendment, cosponsored
by Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) and Sen. Gary Hart
(D-Colo.), both representing western water-rights states.171
The amendment, however, does not mention water transfers or hint that water quality regulation is subordinate to
water transfers, nor does its legislative history. Although
water transfers may be inherent in water use allocation,172
the initial diversion of water for an allocated use is not
regulated by §402. Water diversions add nothing to navigable water; they only subtract from it. Once allocated
and diverted, water is used, most commonly in irrigated
agriculture, after which use it is eventually returned to a
navigable water, often to a different water body than it was
diverted from. When the diverted water is returned, now
polluted, to the same navigable water body or to another
navigable water body, the question arises whether a §402
permit is required. Because §502(14) excludes “return
flows from irrigated agriculture” from the definition of
“point source,”173 no §402 permit is required in most cases
for the return of water from agricultural diversions. This
is reinforced by §402(l), which forbids EPA from requiring a permit for irrigation return flow. Significantly, the
CWA 1977 Amendments added all three of these provisions, §§101(g), 402(l), and 502(14). There is no evidence
that Congress intended §101(g) to limit the reach of the
§402 program, but if Congress did so intend, it defined
171. Although §101(g) was enacted five years after the 1972 CWA, amendments are to be read harmoniously with the rest of the statute, as if they
were part of the original statute. See Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie
Singer, Sutherland Statutes & Statutory Interpretation [hereinafter
Sutherland] §22:34 & 35; Eskridge, supra note 15, at 325, citing Brown
v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 149-51 (1987); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S.
617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
172. Under western water law, diversion of water from a natural water body is a
hallmark of appropriation. Once diverted and used, it may be returned to
the same or a different water body. See generally Tarlock, supra note 154,
ch. 5.
173. It may have been more straightforward for Congress to have placed this
exclusion in the definition of “pollutant” rather than in the definition of
“point source.” All of the examples of point sources given in the definition of
point source are of conveyances of water rather than of types of water. Nevertheless, the intent of Congress not to regulate these agricultural discharges
is clear.
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that limit in §§402(l) and 502(14), removing only irrigation return flows from the permit program.
The Conference Report for the 1977 Amendments
emphasizes that §101(g) “is not intended to change existing law,”174 an intention repeated by Senator Wallop during
U.S. Senate debates.175 Indeed, Senator Wallop acknowledged in his floor statements that water quality, §402
and §404 permits, and other measures under the CWA
may legitimately and necessarily “have some effect on the
method of water usage . . . and incidentally affect individual water rights.”176 He stated that the purpose of the
amendment was to assure that effects on western water
rights “if any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary
water quality considerations.”177 Reflecting all of this, the
Supreme Court held in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Dep’t of Ecology that §§101(g) and 510(2) “do
not limit the scope of water pollution controls that may be
imposed on users who have obtained, pursuant to state law,
a water allocation.”178
The third of EPA’s relied-upon subsections, §304(f),
directs the Agency to issue guidelines to identify pollution from and pollution control techniques for a number of
sources, such as “changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters or ground waters, including
changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.”179 EPA argues
that the listing of these structures in a subsection regarding “non-point sources” implies that dams, levees, channels, causeways, and flow diversions are nonpoint sources
rather than point sources subject to the §402 permit
program. This argument ignores the definition of “point
source,” that specifically includes channels and ditches,180
and that EPA admits that dams may be point sources.181
While “flow diversions” are not on the list of examples of
point sources, once waters are diverted for use in irrigation,
they are transferred for that use in ditches, and “ditch”
is listed in §502(14) as a point source. Thus, when channels and ditches discharge agricultural wastes, they are
point sources, not nonpoint sources, although they may
be exempt from permitting under §§402(l) and 502(14) if
174. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Comm., reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977 [hereinafter Legis.
Hist.], Comm. Print of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, at 186,
234 & 236.
175. “It is not intended to change present law,” which is already established by
§510(b). 3 Legis. Hist. 531.
176. Id. at 532.
177. Id. Senator Wallop was concerned that western water rights might be interfered with by persons using water pollution control measures to achieve
other purposes. He indicated his concern was raised by the then-recent Option Papers for the Water Resource Policy study being conducted by the
Water Resource Policy Council, raising options for using federal water pollution control law to achieve “Federal purposes that were not strictly related
to water quality.” Id. at 531.
178. 511 U.S. 700, 720, 24 ELR 20945 (1994).
179. §304(f )(F) (emphasis added).
180. Section 502(14), 33 U.S.C. §1362(14). Of course, flow diversions are neither point nor nonpoint sources of pollution because they divert from rather
than add to navigable waters.
181. EPA admitted in Gorsuch that under some circumstances dams are point
sources, even though they are not on the statutory list of examples. See 693
F.2d at 165.
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they contain only irrigation return flow. “Well” may also
be inferred to be a nonpoint source by being listed elsewhere in §304(f), but is on the statutory list of examples of
“point source,” an unnecessary exclusion unless wells are
otherwise point sources.182 The Supreme Court in Miccosukee commented that §304(f) does not mean water transfers
are exclusively nonpoint pollution or are exempted from
§402 when they are point sources,183 and EPA admitted
that in its Agency Interpretation.184
Note also that §304(f)(F) deals only with “changes in
the movement, flow, or circulation” of navigable waters”
. . . “by the construction” of the listed facilities, not by their
operation. This wording suggests that for listed facilities
that are point sources, the concern in §304(f) is not their
ultimate discharge into receiving waters, but the effects of
their location, design, and construction on donor waters.
Although the flow-diversion portion of water transfer
facilities are not regulated by §402, because flow diversions
subtract from navigable water rather than adding to it,185
the location, design, and construction of those facilities
may raise water quality issues.
Although EPA does not emphasize it, §208(b)(2)(F)
complements §§304(f)(F), 402(l), and 502(14) by requiring states to identify and provide plans to control pollution
from agricultural nonpoint sources, including irrigation
return flow. Significantly, §§101(g), 208(b)(2)(F), and
402(l), and the exemption for agricultural stormwater and
irrigation return flows in §502(14), were all added to the
CWA in the same set of amendments in 1977, and all originated in the Senate bill.186 The Senate Committee Report
stated that the effect of the amendments “is to exempt
irrigation return flows from all permit requirements” and
made no mention of water diversions or western water
rights.187 Similar comments were made in reporting the
Conference Committee Report to the U.S. House of Representatives.188 Indeed, all but §101(g) were “in recognition
of a specific recommendation of the National Commission of Water Quality.”189 The Commission noted that “[w]
182. Compare §304(f )(D), 33 U.S.C. §1314(f )(D), with §502(14), 33 U.S.C.
§1362(14).
183. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106.
184. Interpretive Memorandum, supra note 131, at 6.
185. Section 316(b) requires best available technology for cooling water intake
structures associated with point sources, to minimize negative environmental impact.
186. H.R. Rep. No. 95-830, at §§5(a), 33(a)-(c) (1977); Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Comm., at 50, 52 & 69, reprinted in 3 Legis.
Hist., at 186, 197, 234, 236 & 253.
187. S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 35 (1977) (Clean Water Act of 1977), reprinted in 4
Legis. Hist. 633, 668.
188. The “conference report exempts return flows from irrigated agriculture from
all permit requirements . . . and recognizes that this activity is not a point
source,” with no mention of water transfers or western water rights. See
Statement on the House floor by Rep. Roberts, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Pub. Works and Transp., authorizing committee for the 1977 Clean Water
Act Amendments, Dec. 17, 1977, reprinted in 3 Legis. Hist. at 318.
189. 3 Legis. Hist. at 318. When Congress enacted the CWA in 1972, it established a National Commission to study the implementation of the statute
and report its recommendations to Congress. The National Commission on
Water Quality submitted its Report to Congress on March 22, 1976, with
recommendations for “mid-course” corrections for the statute. See H.R.
Rep. No. 94-418 (1976).

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

9-2014

NEWS & ANALYSIS

hile there is little doubt that Congress defined irrigation
return flows as point sources” in 1972, controlling them
through the §402 permit program “has proved difficult.”190
The Commission recognized, however, that pollution from
irrigation return flow was an important cause of degradation in the nation’s waters and concluded it should not
be exempted from coverage by the statute. Instead, the
Commission recommended that irrigation return flow be
addressed by more-flexible regulatory measures at the state
level.191 At the same time, the Commission did not identify a conflict between the §402 permit program and water
transfers or western water rights as the root of the irrigation
return flow problem. Indeed, the Commission Report did
not mention water transfers or western water rights.192 If
Congress perceived that §402 interfered with water transfers, it did so in the context of irrigated agriculture, and
it dealt with that issue completely in 1977 by adding language in §§208(b)(2)(F), 304(f)(F), 402(l), and 502(14).
The final provision supporting EPA’s “holistic” analysis,
§510(2), provides that nothing in the CWA shall “be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters . . . of
such states.” This preemption preclusion provision should
be read in conjunction with §510(1), which provides that
the CWA does not preclude a state from adopting or enforcing a limitation on discharges of pollutants or a requirement respecting water pollution control, except that a state
cannot adopt or enforce such a limitation or requirement
less-stringent than a federal requirement under the CWA.
This section does not mention water transfers and does not
hint that regulation of water quality is in any way subordinate to allocation of water use. The first part of the section suggests it is limited to federal and state roles in water
pollution control. The Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 held
that “[s]ections 101(g) and 510(2) preserve the authority of
each State to allocate water quantity as between users; they
do not limit the scope of water pollution controls . . . .”193
Finally, as noted by the Southern District of New York
in Catskill Mountains, the protection of state rights and
jurisdiction in §510 applies “[e]xcept as expressly provided
in this chapter.” “Because this language does not address
what other provisions of the Act ‘expressly’ provide[ ],” this
provision has little bearing on the interpretation of those
190. 3 Legis. Hist. at 40. The difficulty resulted from differences in geography, climate, agricultural method, and drainage, and water application
methods made it impossible to develop uniform national technologybased standards.
191. National Commission on Water Quality, Report to Congress, 40-1 (Mar.
22, 1976). The Staff Draft Report issued November 1975 elaborated on
this. See 3 Legis. Hist. at I-51 to I-54.
192. National Commission on Water Quality, supra note 191. Staff Draft Report at VI-54 to VI-55. The Commission staff did discuss the relationship between water quality control and water use allocation. The staff saw
the two as complementary in part, because water resources are diminished
when they are too polluted to be available for successive use. At the same
time, the staff commented that water quality and water quantity concerns
were not yet “completely compatible,” but made no recommendations to
make them so. The Commission itself did not note any incompatibility
between water quality and water quantity and made no recommendations
to reconcile any incompatibility.
193. 511 U.S. 700, 720, 24 ELR 20945 (1994).
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other provisions—i.e., §§301(a) and 502(12).194 In other
words, the preemption preclusion applies only when the
statute is silent.
The three subsections and one paragraph analyzed
above simply do not support EPA’s assertions that Congress
intended a grand balance in the CWA between federal
water quality control and water use allocation; that Congress intended water transfers to be exempt from the §402
permit program; or that Congress intended water transfers
not to be “additions” in the CWA. None of the four provisions mention water transfers. The Supreme Court has held
that three of them do not so limit the CWA. The legislative sponsor of §101(g), which speaks the most directly of
any of the four provisions to water resource management,
agreed on the Senate floor that water allocation may be
subordinate to water quality control. To interpret §301(a),
the central prohibition of the statute, to exclude a major
category of discharges, such as water transfers, based on
four ambiguous, minor provisions out of hundreds of provisions in the statute would require that the provisions
unambiguously establish the exclusion. They do not.
As the Supreme Court suggested in Miccosukee, EPA’s
interpretation of “addition” and its unitary navigable water
theory are also inconsistent with one of the CWA’s two
grand strategies for controlling water pollution. Before the
enactment of the CWA in 1972, water quality standards
were the only strategy employed for that purpose.195 With
the enactment of the CWA’s technology-based standards
requirements in 1972, water quality standards temporarily took a secondary, fallback role in pollution control,
but resurfaced as the potential driver for further pollution
reduction after pollution sources achieved technologically
achievable pollution reduction.196 Water quality standards
and their implementation are a multistage process with
interplay between EPA and states that Congress established in detail. In the first step, states designate the desired
uses to be made of different navigable waters within their
borders,197 such uses as body contact sports, cold water
fisheries, and drinking water without treatment. In the
next step, states designate the maximum concentrations
of various pollutants, known as criteria, compatible with
the designated uses of the water bodies. Designating uses
is a political decision, designating criteria is a scientific
decision. EPA must approve a state’s designated uses and
194. Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *23.
195. See Frank F. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law §3.03.
196. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program:
Law, Policy, and Implementation (2d ed. 2002). It may seem impossible
that water pollution could be treated beyond the best technology achievable
to meet water quality standards. But while the CWA specifies cost criteria
to be considered in promulgating technology-based standards, it does not
specify them in establishing water quality standards. Compare §304 (a)(&)
(b)(1)(B), (2)(B), and (4)(B), 33 U.S.C. §1314(a) & (b)(1)(B), (2)(B), and
(4)(B). Thus, cost constraints may limit technology-based standards, while
more expensive means of controlling pollution may be necessary and required to achieve water quality standards.
197. Section 303(c)(2); 40 C.F.R. §131.2; see also 40 C.F.R. §130.2. According to EPA’s regulations, a “water quality standard defines the water quality
goals of a water body, or portion thereof, by designating the use or uses to
be made of the water . . . establishing the water quality goals for a specific
water body.”
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supporting criteria, but EPA’s role is much greater with criteria.198 If a state does not adopt an approvable water quality standards program, EPA must do so.199
Once these uses and criteria are in place, effluent limitations for individual §402 permits affecting specific water
bodies or segments are calculated to achieve the more stringent of state established water quality criteria or EPA-promulgated technology-based standards.200 This inherently
requires examining navigable waters as individual water
bodies and separate segments of individual water bodies,
rather than as a unitary whole body of navigable water.
Section 302(a) restates this explicitly for more-protective
water quality uses: If application of effluent limitations in a
permit based on technology-based standards would “interfere” with the “attainment or maintenance of that water
quality in a specific portion of the navigable water . . . effluent limitations . . . for such point source or sources shall be
established which can reasonably be expected to contribute
to the attainment or maintenance of such water quality.”201
The CWA also requires states to develop a list of “those
waters within the State” that will not achieve water quality
standards and “for each segment of the navigable waters”; a
list of point sources preventing achievement of water quality standards for toxic pollutants; and control strategies for
those point sources to achieve the standards.202 Section
319 complements this by requiring states to identify “those
navigable waters within the State, which” cannot attain
water quality standards without controlling nonpoint
sources and to identify “particular nonpoint sources which
add significant pollution to each portion of the” identified
navigable waters.203 In developing nonpoint source control management plans under §319, states are to “develop
and implement [them] . . . on a watershed-by-watershed
basis.”204 EPA’s implementing regulations have states submitting lists of “water quality limited segments,”205 “the
water quality of all waters of the United States” and “waters
needing action,”206 “those waters within the State” and “all
navigable waters in such State” not meeting water quality
standards,” “each segment of navigable waters included on
such list,” and “a water” meeting a condition.207
One aspect of water quality standards merits special
mention, for it overlays this entire pattern. EPA’s regulations require states to establish antidegradation programs
198. Use designation is a political decision, having nothing to do with science.
Establishing criteria, however, requires a scientific judgment of the concentration of particular pollutants that will or will not interfere with a chosen
use. EPA has established detailed scientific guidance on criteria and requires
states to follow that guidance or demonstrate that other criteria are appropriate using scientifically defensible methods. 131 C.F.R. §131.11. By contrast, EPA is wholly responsible for establishing technology-based standards.
§§301(b), 304, and 306.
199. Section 303(b), (c)(4).
200. Sections 301(b), 302(b); 33 U.S.C. §§1311(b), 1312(b).
201. Section 302(a); 33 U.S.C. §1312(a) (emphasis added).
202. Section 304(l)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1314(l). See also EPA’s implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. Parts 130 & 131.
203. Section 319(a)(1)(A) & (B), 33 U.S.C. §1329(a)(1)(A) & (B).
204. Section 319(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. §1329(b)(4).
205. 40 C.F.R. §131.7.
206. 40 C.F.R. §130.8.
207. 40 C.F.R. §130.10(d).
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for waters that have achieved the criteria established for
their designated uses.208 This requirement helps ensure that
pristine waters remain pristine. That is wholly antithetical
to transferring a polluted water into a pristine water.
Water quality standards are established, and achievement of them is accomplished river by river, stream by
stream, lake by lake, water segment by water segment,
reflecting local conditions, local uses, and local goals. The
standards result in effluent limitations for particular point
sources to meet particular local water quality goals. Considering all navigable waters as one does not conform to or
accomplish this strategy on a conceptual basis, much less
on a point source-specific basis. How does a state compile
a list of waters meeting specific and different conditions
if all waters are one? If all navigable waters are one, they
would have the same designated use and be subject to the
same criteria. Perhaps, EPA considers navigable waters as
one just for the purposes of defining addition, but multiple waters for other purposes. That would be an odd concept, perhaps unworkable, and contrary to the canon of
construction that words are to be interpreted identically
throughout a statute.209 It is also contrary to the CWA’s
definition section, which provides that the definitions it
provides apply throughout the statute “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided.”210
The Supreme Court in Miccosukee commented on the
inconsistency between the unitary navigable waters theory
and water quality standards.211 EPA ignored the Court’s
comment and did not respond to it either in the Agency
Interpretation or in the preambles to its proposed and
final rule. Indeed, in the preamble to the final rule, when
responding to public comments that the water transfer
rule was inconsistent and would interfere with water quality standards, EPA only addressed the concern as it related
to water impoundments for settling sediments in mining
wastes, merely replying that the rule “does not affect the
permitting of such facilities”212 and that states can establish their own water quality standards if they wish to.213 Its
assurance was wholly unresponsive to the broader question
of the compatibility of the rule and the theory with water
quality standards under the CWA.
EPA’s “outside world” and unitary navigable water theories also create significant inconsistencies with the §404
program. In a typical §404 wetlands landclearing case,
soil and vegetation are moved from one area to another
208. 40 C.F.R. §131.12. See also §304(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. §1324(d)(4)(B). Although the 1972 version of the CWA did not mention the antidegradation
policy, water quality standards existing at that time contained such provisions and §303(a) continued them in force. When Congress amended §303
in 1987, it included a reference to the antidegradation policy in §303(d)(4)
(B). The Court discusses the history of the antidegradation policy in PUD
No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
718, 24 ELR 20945 (1994).
209. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 324, citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 83
(1990); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assts, Lt., 484
U.S. 335 (1998). See also Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 170-73.
210. Section 502, 33 U.S.C. §1362.
211. 541 U.S. at 107.
212. 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33703; Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *35.
213. 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33705; Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *35.
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area in the same wetland to convert it to a dry and level
field for agricultural or other use.214 If the unitary navigable water theory is applied to such landclearing, there is
no addition, because the material redeposited in the wetland was already in the waters of the United States (the
wetland) and therefore could not be added to the waters
of the United States (another part of the same wetland).
Responding to comments on this, EPA attempted to avoid
the issue in the preamble to the final transfer rule by pointing out that the definition of “pollutant” includes “dredged
spoil,” which by definition comes from water. EPA believes
this makes it clear that Congress “explicitly forbade discharges of dredged material” except in compliance with
a §404 permit, emphasizing that “dredged material” is a
“pollutant.”215 Therefore, EPA believed the rule “would not
have an effect on the 404 program.”216
The expected origin of dredged spoil pollutants in navigable water, however, only addresses the issue of whether
dredged spoil is a “pollutant.” But an activity does not
violate §301(a) because it satisfies one of the four elements
of the offense (“pollutant”); it must meet all four elements,
including “addition” and “navigable waters.”217 Under
both EPA’s “outside world” and “unitary navigable water”
glosses on “addition” and “navigable waters,” the dredged
spoil does not come from a world or a water outside the
wetland or the unitary navigable water. Unless “addition”
and “navigable water” have different meanings for §402
and for §404, many activities currently regulated under
§404 are not subject to §404 jurisdiction under EPA’s
interpretations because the waters from which fill material is taken and the waters to which it is redeposited are
one and the same. But, again, words are to be read consistently throughout the statute under both cannons of
statutory construction and the wording of §502.218 The
interpretation of “addition” in §404 cases is discussed in
more detail below.
The Agency Interpretation and the preamble to the proposed rule view the CWA as constructing a grand balance
between state powers to allocate water use and federal powers to protect water quality. Perhaps, perceiving the weakness of this grand balance approach, discussed above, the
preamble to the final rule more modestly relies on the same
three subsections and one paragraph simply to establish
congressional intent that water transfers not be regulated
214. Avoyelles Fishermen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 13 ELR 20942
(5th Cir. 1983).
215. 73 Fed. Reg. at 33703.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir.
2005) (rejecting challenge to EPA regulation extending §402 permit requirements to concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) making no
additions to navigable water, even though CAFOs are statutorily defined as
point sources); Community Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t, 2011 WL 61882
(W.D. Wash. 2011) (unpermitted CAFO not discharging pollutants to
navigable water does not violate the statute); Nelson Faria Dairy, Inc., Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff’d without opinion, 782
F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1985); Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Hudson, 2012 WL
6651930, 43 ELR 20010 (D. Md. Dec. 20, 2012) (unpermitted CAFO not
discharging pollutants to navigable water does not violate the statute).
218. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 324; Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at
170-73.
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under §402, because application of §402 to water transfers
would interfere with or subvert state water use allocation,
which the CWA preserves. However, the four provisions,
whether individually or collectively, do not support even
this more modest argument, as discussed above. Moreover,
the Agency Interpretation and the preambles never explain
how subjecting water transfers to §402 jurisdiction has
interfered or will interfere with or subvert state water use
allocation. If such interference or subversion is real, surely
EPA would be aware of examples of it during the 40-year
history of the §402 program. But the legislative history
of §101(g), added in 1977 and addressing this issue more
directly than any other subsection in this statute, mentioned no examples of such interference or subversion. Nor
does EPA mention any examples of such interference or
subversion in its Agency Interpretation or the preambles to
its proposed and final rules.
Because use of such examples could only strengthen
EPA’s justification for the transfer rule, EPA’s failure to
mention water transfers negatively impacted by §402
infers such negative impacts are few and far between, if
they exist at all. The lack of relevant case law also suggests water transfers negatively impacted by §402 are not
numerous or are not severely impacted. The only examples
of water transfers challenged for not having §402 permits
are in Florida, New Hampshire, and New York, states
with no western water-law allocation schemes. Indeed, in
none of those decisions is there a hint that the water diversion in question was part of a state water use allocation
scheme. Moreover, despite New York City’s allegations in
Catskill I and II that the application of §402 would cripple
the city’s water supply, presumably by requiring expensive
treatment of the polluted water before its transfer, the Second Circuit noted that there was considerable flexibility
on how the CWA’s requirement could be met under the
circumstances.219 Indeed, if the holding in Catskill II has
crippled the city’s ability to supply water to its citizens,
that inability has been a well-kept secret in the dozen years
following the decision. Not only did EPA fail to describe
the extent of economic harm occasioned by the lack of
the rule, it failed to describe the extent of environmental
harm that would be caused by the rule. What sort of a
reasoned balance is that?

c.

Post-Interpretive Memorandum and
Water Transfer Rule Decisions

In Catskill I, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to proceed with the remedy phase. Appealing from the district court’s decision on remand, New
York City asked the Second Circuit to reconsider Catskill
I in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Miccosukee
and EPA’s 2005 Agency Interpretation. In Catskill Moun219. Catskill II, 451 F.3d 77, 85. The best available technology for preventing
sediments in the transferred water, for instance, might be locating intake
structures at different points in the reservoir, enabling the waters withdrawn
to be taken from the location the least burdened by sediments at the time.
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tains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York
(Catskill II),220 the Second Circuit held that the Supreme
Court’s Miccosukee decision confirmed rather than questioned Catskill I, in particular the Second Circuit’s distinction between interbasin (Gorsuch and Consumers Power)
and intrabasin (Dubois and Catskill I) transfers. Indeed, as
discussed below, the Miccosukee Court had even adopted
the Second Circuit’s “soup ladle” analogy designed to illustrate the differences between such transfers. The Second
Circuit then considered EPA’s new Agency Interpretation,
looking at its “power to persuade” rather than giving it
Chevron deference.221 It found nothing in the document
that the city had not raised, albeit in a less-detailed way, in
Catskill I. The Second Circuit concluded:
In the end, . . . these “holistic” arguments about the allocation of state and federal rights, said to be rooted in the
structure of the statute, simply overlook its plain language . . . . It is the meaning of the word “addition” upon
which the outcome of Catskill I turned and which has
not changed, despite the City’s attempts to shift attention
away from the text of the CWA to its context.222

Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly employ
the two-step Chevron deference test to EPA’s water transfer
rule, it left no doubt how it would have decided the case
under Chevron. With regard to the first step, whether the
statute is ambiguous, the court in Catskill I held the statute’s plain meaning was clear.223 With regard to the second
step, whether the Agency’s interpretation was reasonable,
the court held “[n]o one can reasonably argue that the
water in the Reservoir and the Esopus are in any sense the
‘same’” and that such a conclusion led to absurd results.224
After Catskill II, EPA promulgated its water transfer rule
and multiple parties filed petitions for judicial review in
several federal courts of appeal and in the Southern District of New York. The appeals court petitions were consolidated in the Eleventh Circuit. At the time, the Eleventh
Circuit already had an appeal before it, from a citizen suit
in which the validity of the rule was an issue. The Eleventh
Circuit stayed the consolidated petition for judicial review
until it decided that appeal in Friends of the Everglades v.
South Florida Water Management District,225 reexamining
its earlier rejection of the unitary navigable water theory.226
It initially noted that all existing court of appeals precedents had rejected the theory,227 but that none had considered EPA’s new regulation, which was entitled to Chevron
220. Catskill II, 451 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2006).
221. Catskill II, 451 F.3d. at 82, citing United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S.
218, 235 (2001), and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984). Under Mead, Chevron deference is
due only to agency interpretations developed in rulemaking or other formal
administrative procedure.
222. Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 82.
223. Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 492 & 94.
224. Id. at 492.
225. 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
226. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280
F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002).
227. Friends of the Everglades v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210,
1218 (11th Cir. 2009).

9-2014

deference.228 The court then undertook the familiar twostep Chevron analysis: (1) is the statute ambiguous; and
(2) if so, is the agency’s interpretation a reasonable one?
As to ambiguity, the Eleventh Circuit found that precedents either did not involve interbasin transfers, Gorsuch
and Consumers Power, or did not consider whether the
statute was ambiguous, Catskill I & II and its Miccosukee
decision.229 The court was not correct, however, in reading Catskill I & II to find ambiguity in the meaning of
“addition.”230 After analyzing the wording of the relevant
provisions and the structure of the statute as a whole, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was ambiguous whether
“addition . . . to navigable waters” in §502(12) “referred to
waters in the individual sense or as one unitary whole.”231
The court concluded that the use of the plural “waters” was
not dispositive, for it could be used to denote all waters
in general or specific waters in particular, for example,
the waters of Mobile Bay.232 While the absence of “any”
before “navigable waters” and its presence before the other
three elements of the offense was suggestive that “navigable
waters” was meant generally rather than specifically, that
inconsistency was not dispositive either, because Congress
included or omitted “any” before “navigable water” or
“navigable waters” elsewhere in the statute randomly rather
than connoting either general or specific waters.233 All of
these arguments, of course, are directed at the meaning of
“navigable water,” not “addition.”
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the structure of the statute as a whole did not resolve the ambiguity. In this inquiry, it considered the statute’s objective
of restoring and maintaining the integrity of the nation’s
waters in §101(a), the dominant role of the §402 permit
program in achieving that objective, and the absurdity of
“pumping dirty canal water into a reservoir of drinking
water” without a permit.234 The court found that while “it
may seem inconsistent with the lofty goals” of the CWA
“to leave out of the permitting process the transfer of pollutants from one navigable body of water to another, . . .
it is no more so than to leave out all non-point sources,
allowing agricultural run-off to create a huge ‘dead zone’
in the Gulf of Mexico.”235 That is a bad analogy, however,
for Congress chose explicitly not to regulate nonpoint
sources through the §402 permit program. It did not make
an explicit choice to exempt water transfers from the §402
permit program.
In the end, the Eleventh Circuit wrongly found the
statute ambiguous and, for the same reasons, found EPA’s
interpretation of “addition” reasonable, although the court
might have reached a different interpretation on its own.
228. Id. at 1219.
229. Id. at 1220-22.
230. Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 492, 94; Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 84.
231. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1223.
232. In the absence of an indication in the statute to the contrary, the singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular. See Scalia & Garner,
supra, note 15, at 129-31. See also 1 U.S.C. §1.
233. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1224-25.
234. Id. at 1225-26.
235. Id. at 1227.
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The court’s examination of the structure of the statute, on
which it based both its Chevron step one and step two analyses, is significantly deficient. The court failed to examine
or even to perceive the weaknesses in EPA’s arguments that
§§101(b), 101(g), 304(f)(F), and 510(1) established a grand
balance between water quality and water quantity. And it
failed entirely to consider that the rule was inconsistent
with the water quality standards strategy of the statute and
with the §404 permit program.
To illustrate the reasonableness of EPA’s interpretation,
the Eleventh Circuit posited the analogy of the four-marble rule:
Two buckets sit side by side, one with four marbles in it
and the other with none. There is a rule prohibiting “any
addition of any marbles to buckets by any person.” A
person comes along, picks up two marbles from the first
bucket, and drops them into the second bucket. Has the
marble-mover “add[ed] any marbles to buckets?” On the
one hand, as the Friends of the Everglades might argue,
there are now two marbles in a bucket where there were
none before, so an addition of marbles has occurred. On
the other hand, as the Water District might argue and as
the EPA would decide, there were four marbles in buckets
before, and there are still four marbles in buckets, so no
addition of marbles has occurred. Whatever position we
might take if we had to pick one side or the other we cannot say that either side is unreasonable.236

While either interpretation may be reasonable when
involving solid, inert marbles, are they equally reasonable
when involving four ounces of liquid or dissolved toxic pollutants in a bucket? To get equal amounts of liquid or dissolved pollutants in both buckets (two ounces in each), the
contents of both buckets would have to be mixed together
in a larger container and then equally divided between the
two buckets, considerably more complicated than playing
marbles. Moreover, the end result would be two buckets
with poisonous water rather than one, not consistent with
the goals of the CWA, especially the antidegradation provision, which the court did not consider.
Once the Eleventh Circuit decided this citizens suit
appeal, it turned to the consolidated petitions for judicial
review of the water transfer rule and dismissed them for
lack of jurisdiction under §509(b).237 In the meantime,
the Southern District of New York had stayed the consolidated petitions before it, pending the outcome of the petitions in the Eleventh Circuit.238 After the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed those petitions, the Southern District vacated
its stay and proceeded with judicial review of the rule in
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. U.S.
EPA.239 In this, the most recent decision on the issue, the
district court vacated and remanded EPA’s rule. Turning
to the first step of the Chevron analysis, the court agreed
236. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d 1228.
237. Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. EPA, 699 F.3d 1280, 42 ELR 20222 (11th
Cir. 2012).
238. Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544 at *26.
239. Id.
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with the Eleventh Circuit that the CWA was ambiguous
as to whether it required water transfers to have §402 permits.240 On the Chevron step-two analysis, however, the
court found EPA’s interpretation to be unreasonable for
many of the reasons discussed above, especially because:
(1) EPA’s “holistic” analysis of the CWA was anything but
holistic, examining only the four small parts of the statute supposedly favoring its conclusion and ignoring the
overwhelming remainder of the statute not supporting it;
and (2) EPA gave no reasoned justification for its decision,
including an explanation of how the rule was consistent
with water quality standards and the §404 permit program
and an analysis of the relative harms to the economy and
the environment of promulgating and of not promulgating
the rule. The decision is very thorough, making it easy for
the Second Circuit to affirm on appeal, especially because
it is in accord with the Second Circuit’s own earlier decisions. If the Second Circuit does affirm, the decision will
result in a split between the Second and Eleventh Circuits
on EPA’s rule, setting the basis for a grant of certiorari by
the Supreme Court for resolution of the issue it did not
reach earlier in Miccosukee.
An interesting and perhaps significant aspect of the
appellate decisions discussed above is that all but one
develops or adopts an analogy to describe the unitary navigable waters theory or to distinguish interbasin from intrabasin transfers.241 The district court in Catskill Mountains
240. Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **31-55. Although, as discussed
above, it appears that the Second Circuit had already concluded that the
statute was not ambiguous on that issue with regard to EPA’s Agency Interpretation, it had not precisely held so because EPA had not yet promulgated
its water transfer rule, so that the Second Circuit was not performing a
Chevron analysis.
241. The Supreme Court in Miccosukee adopts the analogy from Catskill I that in
an intrabasin transfer, “‘one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the
pot, and pours it back into the pot . . . [not adding] soup or anything else
to the pot’” 541 U.S. at 110, quoting 273 F.3d at 492 (discussed in further
detail in the Article at Section III.C.1., below). The Second Circuit developed the “soup ladle” analogy to characterize Gorsuch and Consumers Power,
both involving discharges of water from one water body back to the same
water body, and to distinguish them from Catskill I, involving the discharge
from one water body to a distinctly different water body. The Second Circuit agreed that no permit was required for a transfer within the same water
body, otherwise, “the EPA might as easily require a permit for Niagara Falls.”
273 F.3d 292. In the case of Niagara Falls, the discharge is not “by any
person” and would therefore not require a CWA permit. The district court
in Dubois, in adopting the government’s unitary navigable waters theory (in
that decision called the “singular entity” theory), developed the analogy of
a “pond in which ‘we place a pipe . . . and we pump the pond water from
the bottom to the surface. No one would reasonably contend that internal
pumping causes an “addition” of pollutants to the pond. Instead, we would
consider the pumping to be a redistribution of pollutants from one part of
the pond to another.’” Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 129697, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting the unreported district court
decision). The First Circuit rejected the comparison as “not at all analogous
to the instant case” that featured a transfer between two distinct bodies of
water that would not mingle in a state of nature. Id. at 1297. In Friends of
the Everglades, Inc. v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2006 WL 3635465 at
*34 (S.D. Fla. 2006), a post-Miccosukee decision, the defendant offered, as
an analogy for the unitary navigable water theory, “a hypothetical law that
bans the addition of wine to the United States. The ban would undoubtedly
apply to the importation of wine from, for example, France or Italy. However, it would have no effect on the movement of wine from California to
Florida, as movement between states would not result in the addition of any
wine to the United States as a whole.”
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labeled them “warring analogies.”242 These analogies raise
several questions. Why do the courts of appeal use analogies in all but one of their water transfer decisions, but use
them in only one other decision interpreting “addition”?243
Why do courts use them so pervasively to interpret “addition,” but not to interpret “pollutant,” “navigable water,” or
“point source?”
Are the analogies useful in determining the meaning of
“addition”? We use analogies to explain an abstract or difficult idea by making it more concrete and easier to understand, suggesting that courts find the idea of the unitary
navigable water theory singularly difficult to grasp. But the
idea of all navigable water being one entity is not difficult
to understand. What is difficult to understand is the rationale of applying that abstract concept to water pollution
control. The analogies may help understand the theory, but
they do not suggest a rationale for the theory, and they
certainly do not explain the meaning of “addition.” The
wine import ban analogy in Friends of the Everglades, for
instance, is understandable as a means of economic protectionism, but why would we require §402 permits for transfers of water from Manitoba 244 to Montana, but not from
Idaho to Montana, when the water quality impacts are the
same? The four-marble analogy raises the question of why
our water pollution control statute would authorize doubling the number of polluted stream miles, as opposed to
continuing pollution only where it currently exists; indeed,
this is inconsistent with EPA’s antidegradation policy.245
The courts’ use of analogies regarding the unitary navigable water theory signals their unease with the theory; the
analogies they develop do not alleviate that unease.
If a point source adds a pollutant to a navigable water
in the course of an interbasin transfer, that transfer should
require a §402 permit. EPA has exempted such a transfer
from §402, however, in its water transfer rule. EPA justifies its rule, not as an interpretation of “addition,” but
instead as a “holistic interpretation” of the statute, based
on four brief passages that EPA sees as establishing a
“grand balance” between water quality achievement and
water resource management. Examined closely, none of the
four passages support EPA’s use of them. Even if they did,
four brief passages are insufficient to support any grand
balance in a 200-page-long statute. Worse, the “unitary
navigable waters” theory underlying EPA’s interpretation
of “addition” in the rule is incompatible with water quality standards, particularly the antidegradation policy, and
drastically limits the jurisdiction of the §404 permitting
program. EPA’s flimsy construct cannot withstand the
force of the basic goals and strategies of the CWA, each
rooted in long, explicit, and detailed statutory provisions.
242. Indeed, the district court used warring analogies as one indication in its
first-step Chevron analysis to find that the CWA was ambiguous on the
meaning of “addition” in the context of water transfers.
243. The court in Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1145
(10th Cir. 2005), analogized abandoned mining operations to leaky faucets:
“[I]f you own the leaky ‘faucet,’ you are responsible for its ‘drips.’”
244. Manitoba intervened as a plaintiff in Catskill Mountains, seeking to overturn
the rule. See Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544 (caption to decision).
245. 40 C.F.R. §131.12. See also 33 U.S.C. §303(d)(4)(B).
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The rule and the theory are contrary to the purposes and
structures of the statute, are bad policy, and should either
be withdrawn by EPA or overturned on judicial review.
On the other hand, the definition of “addition” suggested in this Article applies comfortably to water transfers,
without creating interpretive difficulties. Under that definition, water transfers that add pollution to receiving waters
require §402 permits. Transfers are the but-for causes of
pollutants from dirty navigable donor water flowing into
clean navigable receiving water; they add pollutants from
the donor water to the receiving water, when the pollutants
would not otherwise be in the receiving water. This will not
sound the death knell of western water rights; EPA offers
no evidence that §402 has interfered in any significant way
with western water rights for the last 40 years, probably
because the CWA itself exempts the return of agricultural
irrigation water from the §402 permit program.

B.

Indirect Additions to Water From the Air

Some point sources directly add pollutants to the air and
indirectly add the same pollutants to water, when gravity or precipitation take them from the air to the water
below. The most-detailed analyses of such indirect additions are in challenges to aerial spraying of pesticides into
or near navigable water in an attempt to eradicate mosquitoes carrying the West Nile virus or other pathogens.
In No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York,246 the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin New York City from spraying pesticides, on the grounds that the spraying constituted the addition of pollutants to navigable waters from
point sources without §402 permits. The city applied
the pesticides for a purpose and in a manner EPA had
approved under the federal statute regulating the manufacturing, sale, and use of pesticides, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).247 FIFRA
authorizes applications of EPA-registered pesticides, for
EPA-approved purposes, and in accordance with directions on EPA-approved labels.
The Southern District of New York decided the case
primarily on the grounds that Congress intended pesticide application to be governed by FIFRA rather than the
CWA, and that Congress did not intend the CWA’s citizen
suit provision to be used to enforce FIFRA, which lacks
such a provision. But the court also held, with little analysis, that pesticides sprayed near water and drifting into
water were not added to water. According to the court,
the city “discharge[d] the insecticides into the atmosphere
and not into the navigable waters. It would be stretching the language of the statute well beyond the intent
of Congress to hold that the de minimus incidental drift
over navigable waters is a discharge from a point source
into those waters.”248 The court commented that the “fact
that a pollutant might ultimately end up in the navigable
246. 2000 WL 1401458 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), rev’d, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2003).
247. 7 U.S.C. §§136-136y, ELR Stat. FIFRA §§2-35.
248. No Spray Coalition, 2000 WL 1401458 at *3.
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waters as it courses through the environment,” does not
make its use a violation of CWA §301(a). If it did, every
emission of “smoke, exhaust fumes and pesticides” would
violate the statute.249
Two neighboring New York district courts came to the
same conclusion, using both the same and different reasoning. In Altman v. Town of Amherst,250 the Western District’s
main reasoning was that pesticides used for their intended
purposes were not pollutants, also holding that FIFRA
rather than the CWA governed. In Peconic Baykeeper, Inc.
v. Suffolk County,251 the Eastern District’s main reasoning was cursory: “[a]tmospheric emission of aereal adulticides are not defined as a pollutant [and] at no time was
the spray made directly to navigable water.” The court also
held that FIFRA governed the situation and that the spray
bars attached to trucks and planes were not point sources.
Finally, it deferred to EPA’s policy that such spraying of
pesticides was not subject to permitting under CWA §402.
The Second Circuit reversed all three decisions, on different grounds. In No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New
York,252 it held that if the plaintiffs alleged a cognizable
cause of action for a violation of the CWA, they could
maintain a citizen suit under it. The court, however, did
not address whether the plaintiffs in the case alleged a cognizable CWA cause of action, in particular whether discharges of pesticides into the atmosphere near navigable
water could constitute an addition to the navigable waters
into which they drifted or whether spraying pesticides in
compliance with FIFRA could violate the CWA. In Altman v. Town of Amherst, the Second Circuit found that the
district court had granted a motion for summary judgment
on an insufficient record and remanded the case to proceed
with discovery, allowing plaintiffs to make their case that
defendant had added pollutants to navigable waters from
point sources.253 The court stated that until EPA “articulates a clear interpretation of current law—among other
things, whether properly used pesticides released into or
over waters of the United States can trigger the requirement for a NPDES permit—the question of whether properly used pesticides can be pollutants that violate the CWA
will remain open.”254
Before the Second Circuit decided Peconic Baykeeper,
Inc. v. Suffolk County,255 EPA, hoping to avoid such litigation or at least affect its outcome, issued an interpretive
statement and promulgated a rule exempting from the
§402 permit requirements the application of registered
FIFRA pesticides for FIFRA-approved purposes and in
accordance with FIFRA-approved labels. The exemption
covered both (1) direct application to navigable waters for
control of waterborne pests and (2) application to land
adjacent to navigable waters for control of pests on adjacent
249. Id.
250. 190 F. Supp. 2d 467 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
251. 585 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D. N.Y. 2008).
252. 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2003).
253. 47 Fed. Appx. 62 (2d Cir. 2002).
254. Id. at 67.
255. 600 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2010).
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land, from which pesticides drift into navigable waters.256
The Second Circuit thereafter decided Peconic Baykeeper,
cognizant of the rule, which the Sixth Circuit by then had
overturned in National Cotton Council of America v. U.S.
EPA,257discussed immediately below. Because the Sixth
Circuit had stayed its mandate, the rule remained in effect
and authorized many of the defendant’s actions. On the
facts found by the district court, however, some of the
spraying appeared not to be in conformity with the FIFRA
label, and the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s
ruling to that extent.
Although judicial review of EPA’s pesticide application
rule in National Cotton Council focused on EPA’s interpretation of “pollutant,” it also considered the meaning
of “addition.” EPA argued that pesticides are not pollutants, while admitting that excess pesticides and pesticide
residues are pollutants.258 It then argued that pesticide
applicators spray pesticides (nonpollutants), but do not
spray excess pesticides or pesticide residue (pollutants).
Thus, EPA argued, pesticide applicators do not add pollutants to the water because the pesticides they spray are
not “pollutants” and they do not spray excess pesticides or
pesticide residue, which are pollutants. Excess pesticides
and pesticide residue “are not created [and hence are not
added] until later, presumably after they are already in the
water.”259 But the Sixth Circuit concluded that EPA offered
no support, other than this descriptive narrative, “for its
assertion that a pesticide must be ‘excess’ or ‘residue’ at the
time of discharge [addition] if it is to be considered as discharged from a point source. This omission of authority is
understandable, as none exists.”260 Indeed, EPA’s semantic gymnastics261 ignore the reality that when the pesticide
applicator sprays pesticides, it is simultaneously spraying
molecules of pesticide, a few of which hit their targets and
most of which do not, but instead fall into water, although
it is impossible to tell at the point of spraying which molecules of the sprayed material will be in each category.
The court rejected EPA’s attempt to tie “addition” to
“point source” in a temporal sense, finding it “unsupported
by the Act” and contrary to the purpose of the permit program to prevent harmful discharges, which include “discharges which are innocuous at the time they are made
256. 40 C.F.R. §122.3(h).
257. 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009).
258. This mirrors earlier arguments by EPA that consumer products used for
their intended purposes are not waste under the RCRA, governing the management and disposal of hazardous waste. For instance, EPA determined
that lead shot fired over water at ducks or skeet, missing them, and falling
in the water were consumer products used for their intended products and
were not waste under EPA’s definition of that term. See Cordiano v. Metacom Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009). The argument might
be applicable to pollutants fitting only within one of the subcategories of
“waste” in §502(6), e.g., “chemical waste.”
259. National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 939.
260. Id.
261. EPA’s semantic gymnastics in National Cotton Council are reminiscent of the
metaphysics of United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th
Cir. 2000) (discussed in the Article at Section III.C.1., below), in which
dredged material is metamorphosed into pollutants when the dredge lifts
from the water.
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but extremely harmful at a later point.”262 It found that
the plaintiff’s position conformed to EPA’s “outside world”
gloss on “addition,” because the pesticide applicator adds
pesticide residue or excess to the water from the outside
world. Moreover, although not noted by the court, spraying the pesticide from a point source is the but-for cause of
the pesticide residue and excess entering navigable water.263
In Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S.
Department of the Army,264 environmental advocates
challenged the Army’s incineration of chemical warfare
agents, in part because CWA §301(f) prohibits the “discharge . . . [of] . . . any . . . radiological, chemical, or
biological warfare agent.” The state of Utah had issued
a Clean Air Act (CAA)265 permit authorizing emissions
from the U.S. Army’s incinerator. The plaintiffs contended that some of those emissions would be added to
navigable waters by unspecified “atmospheric deposition,”
in violation of §301(f).266 The Tenth Circuit rejected the
claim, concluding that the “stack emissions constitute
discharges into the air—not water,”267 labeling them
“indirect discharges.”268 In addition, the court rejected
the plaintiffs’ argument because it would create a regulatory conflict between the CWA and the CAA, enacted by
Congress to regulate such emissions.269
In both of these situations, it is important to remember
that all four elements of §301(a) must be met before the
CWA is violated, and the only issue considered in this Article is whether these types of emissions into the air constitute additions to water. The two other significant questions
are whether these materials are pollutants, especially those
whose purpose is introduction in, on, or into the water and
whether point sources convey them to the water or merely
into the air. Even if all four elements are met in a given
instance, it is possible that another statute governs or that
regulation by another statute could influence how EPA or
courts interpret one of the elements.
None of the decisions in these cases analyze the “addition” element in any depth, although many of them allude
to it. The most that can be deduced from the decisions is
that spraying pesticides directly on water may be addition,
while long-range land and water deposition from smoke262. National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 939.
263. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 12 ELR 20538 (1982),
a citizen suit against Navy bombing practice in which many bombs missed
their targets and landed in the sea. Although the case is similar on the facts,
the Court did not analyze the “addition” issue.
264. 111 F.3d 1485, 27 ELR 21130 (10th Cir. 1997).
265. Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA
§§101-618.
266. Chemical Weapons Working Grp., 111 F.3d at 1489-91.
267. Id. at 1490.
268. Id. at 1490 n.3. “Indirect discharges” was a confusing choice of words because “indirect dischargers” under the CWA refers to industrial dischargers to municipal sewage treatment systems. See 40 C.F.R. §122.2. While
those indirect dischargers do not require §402 permits, they are subject to
directly applicable and directly enforceable technology-based pretreatment
standards for toxic pollutants and to general prohibitions against interfering
with or passing untreated through a municipal sewage treatment plant. See
§307(b), 33 U.S.C. §1317(b).
269. 111 F.3d at 1490-91. See also United States ex rel. McKeown v. Port Auth.
of N.Y. & N.J., 162 F. Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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stacks are not direct addition, but may be indirect addition.
While spraying pesticides from an airplane and spewing
air pollutants from smokestacks appear to be similar, in
that both emit material into the air and some of the material predictably finds its way into water by natural means,
the actions are very different in terms of their underlying
facts. The underlying factual differences in turn result in
differences in the feasibility of regulating them within the
CWA’s structure. And those differences, in turn, affect the
analysis of how to interpret the CWA in pari materia with
the other statutes.
The underlying factual differences between these two
situations are apparent. The pesticide-spraying plane flies
above water, points the nozzles of its spray bar at the water,
the target pests it aims at are in or fly above the water,
and most of the pesticide inevitably enters the water without making contact with the targets. The pesticides enter
the water from the plane much as they would pour into
the water from a horizontal industrial or municipal outfall pipe terminating a few feet above the receiving water.
So described, it is difficult to characterize this as anything
other than direct addition of the pesticides to the water.
The smokestack, however, is not above the water, but is
on dry land, perhaps many miles from water. It points its
emissions straight up into the air. It has no targets in or
above the water; its purpose is to dispose of waste into the
air. Some of its emissions eventually come to rest on land,
some on water, and some wander to the upper atmosphere.
Some of its emissions ultimately may fall into hundreds of
separate water bodies, located in many states downwind
from the smokestack. In turn, any one of these waters may
receive pollutants from many upwind smokestacks in different states. It is difficult to characterize the smokestacks
as adding this material to any particular water, except indirectly and inadvertently.
Direct addition by spraying pesticides over water is
susceptible to regulation under the CWA because there is
an identifiable pollutant, an identifiable point source, an
identifiable addition, and an identifiable navigable receiving water, usually located in the same state in which the
spraying occurs. Issuing or denying a CWA permit for
spraying pesticides on a particular water body adds no
complications to the normal CWA permit issuance process, requiring only the determinations of whether there
are applicable technology-based standards (there are none
at present), whether best management practices are available to minimize the waste pesticide and pesticide residue
that reach the water, and whether the spraying will interfere with the attainment of the designated water quality
standards applicable to the receiving water. Most of the relevant environmental protection can be provided by issuing
a CWA permit requiring best management practices or by
denying the permit because the spraying will violate water
quality standards.
On the other hand, emissions from smokestacks are far
more difficult to regulate under the CWA. Because EPA has
not promulgated a technology-based standard under the
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CWA for smokestack emissions, it would have to base the
permit’s effluent limitations in a CWA permit for smokestack emissions largely on preventing the emissions from
violating the water quality standards of the waters into
which they fell.270 Indeed, when issuing a CWA permit,
EPA or the state must ensure that the pollutants discharged
will not violate water quality standards “established pursuant to any State law or regulations.”271 Moreover, the
permit issuer must notify both EPA and downwind states
whose waters are affected of the proposed permit, allowing
them to comment and request a public hearing.272 If EPA
is the permit issuer, it could establish effluent limitations
in the permit to meet affected water quality standards in
states downwind from the permitted source.273 If a state is
the permit issuer, EPA presumably could veto a permit that
failed to provide effluent limitations to meet affected water
quality standards in downwind states.274
Applying water quality standards to smokestack emissions, however, presents two complications. First, the emissions from a smokestack, particularly a tall one, may fall
into many downwind water bodies in many states. The
only way to determine which water bodies smokestack
emissions might enter is by developing a mathematical
model, by definition only an approximation of reality.275
Once each of the hundreds of receiving water bodies are
identified, the states in which each receiving water body
is located must calculate the total maximum daily load
(TMDL) for each relevant pollutant to determine whether
the smokestack emissions would have to be limited. If they
do, the states in which the affected water bodies are located
would have to develop waste-load allocations to determine
how much of the required emission reductions would be
allocated to the particular smokestack. This invites interstate disputes, because the state with the receiving water
develops TMDLs for its waters and has every incentive to
disproportionately burden out-of-state pollution sources. A
single smokestack whose emissions eventually fall into hundreds of water bodies could be subject to hundreds of such
exercises for a variety of pollutants. Worse, the exercises for
each water body would have to consider each smokestack
whose emissions enter that water body, and there may be
hundreds of such smokestacks.
Developing TMDLs considering traditional water pollution sources took decades and protracted litigation,276
strongly suggesting that the more difficult task of controlling thousands of indirect smokestack sources in hundreds
of TMDLs would take the better part of this century
and convert most litigation lawyers into TMDL warriors.
270. In the absence of promulgated effluent guidelines for technology-based
standards, the permit writer could devise technology-based standards on a
case-by-case basis using best engineering judgment. See §402(a).
271. Section 301(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
272. Section 402(b)(3) & (5).
273. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 22 ELR 20552 (1992).
274. Section 402(d).
275. See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. EPA, 784 F.2d 224, 16 ELR 20447 (6th Cir. 1986), in
which the court held that EPA’s reliance on a computer-generated model to
calculate emissions limitations for smokestacks was arbitrary and capricious.
276. See Houck, supra note 196.
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Water pollution permits are simply not designed to control
smokestack air pollution. Similar complications prompted
the Supreme Court to reject the considerably easier application of injured downstream states’ common-law torts to
point source pollution from upstream states.277
Programs have been developed under the CAA, however, to deal with just such problems. It is far more feasible to regulate smokestack emissions under the CAA
than under the CWA. While it is beguiling for friends of
clean water to interpret the CWA to regulate all activities
producing emissions that eventually enter water, particularly in cases where most or all of the material inevitably
falls into nearby navigable water278 (atmospheric deposition is a major source of water pollution, accounting, for
example, for most of the mercury in the Great Lakes and
the acidification of lakes in the Northeast and neighboring Canada),279 nothing in the CWA speaks explicitly to
regulating such indirect additions. “Addition” could be
interpreted to cover them or not cover them. Each of the
actions at issue, however, is routinely and typically regulated by another federal statute, the CAA or FIFRA. Those
other statutes authorize EPA to take the impact on water
quality into account in regulating air emissions and pesticide applications, enabling EPA to prevent water pollution
without invoking the CWA.280 The question in both situations is how best to interpret the statutes involved to implement them without conflict.
The underlying concept of in pari materia comes into
play when two statutes may govern the same situation. In
pari materia posits that “similar statutes should be interpreted similarly”281 and “interpreted together, as if they
were one law.”282 A corollary is that statutes should be
277. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495-500, 17 ELR
20327 (1987).
278. A pioneering article makes the case that atmospheric deposition of pollutants into navigable water may violate the basic prohibition of the CWA. See
Amil Anthony, Shotguns, Spray, and Smoke: Regulating Atmospheric Deposition of Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 29 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y
215 (2011). Amil Anthony’s argument might be stronger if augmented with
an element-by-element analysis. However, he underestimates the interference with the CAA and FIFRA of regulating air emissions and pesticide
application under the CWA. While his argument may not lead to a revolutionary expansion of CWA jurisdiction, it may provide a template in particularly deserving cases, much as Mary Christina Wood’s article, Regulating
Discharges Into Ground Water: The Critical Link in Pollution Control Under
the CWA, 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 369-426 (1988), did for CWA citizen
suits against point source addition of pollutants to tributary groundwater.
279. Anthony, supra note 278, at 221-32.
280. CAA §109(b), 42 U.S.C. §7409(b), requires EPA to promulgate primary
and secondary air quality standards, primary standards protecting public
health and secondary standards protecting public welfare, both of which
could include effects on water, see CAA §302(h), 42 U.S.C. §7602(h). Air
quality standards are much like water quality criteria under the CWA: they
trigger many of the regulatory requirements under their respective statutes.
Moreover, the CAA includes a regional cap-and-trade program to control
acid rain deposition from midwestern coal-fired power plants affecting waters in the northeastern United States and eastern Canada. See CAA §§401416, 42 U.S.C. §§7651-7651o. FIFRA §3(c)(5)(C), 7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(5)
(C), provides as one criterion for EPA’s registration of a pesticide for a particular use that “it will perform its intended function without unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment.” “Environment,” of course, includes
“water.” See FIFRA §2(j), 7 U.S.C. §136(j).
281. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 327.
282. Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 252. See also Sutherland, supra note
170, at §51:2.
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interpreted not to conflict with each other.283 If a conflict
between statutes cannot be avoided, the more-specific statute or the latest in time governs.284 The initial question is
whether statutes are in pari materia. Justice Antonin Scalia
writes that statutes relating to the same subject, having one
object in view, or acting in one system fall within that category. Under that definition, surely the CAA and the CWA
are in pari materia: Both protect the ambient environment,
have similar goals, have similar structures, share common
tactics and strategies to control discharges of pollutants
to air and water, and even have very similar provisions.285
FIFRA is further afield; it is a product-control statute with
a completely different structure than the CWA, using different tactics and strategies, and having no similar provisions.286 As a product-control statute, its first purpose is to
assure that pesticides are efficacious,287 as well as not unreasonably harmful to the environment.288 Although FIFRA
is not as closely related to the CWA as is the CAA, Justice
Scalia has observed that all statutes are part of a single corpus juris, and courts should interpret them accordingly.289
Interpreting statutes in pari materia avoids interpreting a statute to conflict with another statute, and avoids
creating requirements on the regulated public that conflict with requirements imposed on it by other statutes.
The in pari materia analysis of whether the CWA applies
to spraying pesticides regulated by FIFRA is different
from whether the CWA applies to emitting pollutants
from smokestacks regulated by the CAA. The CWA and
FIFRA do not perform the same functions in protecting
the environment. Under FIFRA, EPA registers pesticides
for uses and applications that will not result in “unreasonable effects on the environment,” including water.290 By
its nature, EPA’s determination in the registration process
is whether a pesticide will have unreasonable effects on
water generally, rather than on particular water bodies,
for it is not clear to what water bodies pesticides will be
applied until they are manufactured, sold, and about to
be used, well after FIFRA registration. Under the CWA,
however, EPA’s determinations of whether to issue or
deny a permit and of what effluent limitations to include
in a permit are based, in part, on protecting individual
water bodies and the water quality standards designated
283. Sutherland, supra note 170, at §51:2.
284. Id.
285. Both have ambient standards, NAAQS, national ambient air quality standards, and WQS, water quality standards, that are to be met by controlling
pollution. Both use technology-based standards. Both are implemented by
cooperative federalism. Both have similar inspection, enforcement, and citizen suit provisions.
286. Instead of controlling the discharge of pollutants by individual sources, FIFRA registers pesticides.
287. FIFRA §3(c)(5)(A), 7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(5)(A) (that “[the product’s] composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it”).
288. FIFRA §3(c)(5)(C), 7 U.S.C. §136(5)(C) (that “[the product] will
perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment”).
289. Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 252-56. See also Sutherland, supra
note 170, at §51.3, “various statutes relating to environmental policy” are in
pari materia.
290. FIFRA’s definition of “environment” includes water. See FIFRA §2(j), 7
U.S.C. §136(j).
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for them. Moreover, FIFRA’s “unreasonable effects of the
environment” standard involves an “economic, social, and
environmental” risk/benefit analysis,291 while the water
quality standards designated under the CWA for particular water bodies are not limited by economic impact or
any other risk/benefit analysis.292
If EPA denies a CWA §402 permit for spraying a pesticide on a particular water body or adds conditions beyond
those already imposed by FIFRA on such spraying to
achieve its water quality standards, the denial or extra
conditions would not interfere with FIFRA’s goals of providing that approved pesticides are efficacious and do not
unreasonably adversely affect the environment. There is no
conflict if both statutes apply; the more-stringent requirements govern in any particular situation, providing the
greatest protection of the environment. Finally, issuing or
denying a CWA permit for spraying pesticides on a particular water body adds no complications to the normal CWA
permit issuance process, requiring only the determinations
of whether there are applicable technology-based standards
(there are none at present), whether management practices
are available to minimize the pesticide that reaches the
water, and whether the spraying will interfere with attainment of the designated water quality standard for the particular and known water body.
On the other hand, the CWA and CAA perform many
of the same or similar functions in protecting the environment. Both provide for the issuance of permits to sources
of emissions or discharges of pollutants to protect the
environment. Both apply technology-based standards for
pollution reduction and both condition permits to meet
ambient standards in the air or water. They are in pari
materia and should be interpreted in harmony. Of course,
they could be in harmony if both applied to a particular
smokestack and the more-stringent of the two governed.
That is how the CWA reconciles differences between federal and state water pollution requirements.293 And the
imposition of the more-stringent standard does not interfere with the environmental protection afforded by the
superseded statute, since by definition it provides greater
environmental protection. But because the CAA primarily regulates smokestacks, and some emissions from many
or most smokestacks eventually fall into water, requiring
CWA permits for smokestack emissions could result in
the CWA superseding the CAA in many or most cases,
a result almost certainly not intended by Congress.
Moreover, the issuance of CWA permits to smokestacks
imposes such great complications on CWA permit issuance process that it is doubtful Congress intended the
CWA to apply in such cases.
Concluding that spraying pesticides onto navigable
water is a classical addition of pollutants to navigable water
from a point source under the CWA does not conflict with
291. FIFRA §2(bb), 7 U.S.C. §136(bb).
292. CWA §§303 & 304(a), 33 U.S.C. §§1313 & 1314(a). But see CWA
§302(b), 33 U.S.C. §1312(b).
293. CWA §510, 33 U.S.C. §1370.
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FIFRA. Moreover, the considerations necessary to issue or
deny a CWA §402 permit for spraying pesticides into water
do not differ substantially from the considerations necessary to issue or deny §402 permits for adding pollutants
to navigable water from other point sources. On the other
hand, concluding that emissions from a smokestack require
a CWA permit because some of those emissions eventually enter navigable water would conflict with the CAA by
largely superseding it. Moreover, the difficulties in issuing
CWA permits for smokestack emissions are overwhelming.
While it may be tempting to define the CWA’s jurisdiction to include regulation of emissions from the occasional
smokestack whose emissions largely fall on and significantly pollute an adjacent body of water, this author knows
of no principled way to differentiate between smokestacks
that sufficiently pollute a water body to be regulated under
the CWA and those that pollute many water bodies insufficiently to be regulated under it.
While the above analysis is directed toward pesticides
sprayed from airplanes and emissions from smokestacks,
the same analysis can be performed to determine whether
any activity discharging pollutants into the air that come
to rest, in whole or in part, in water is regulated by the
CWA or another statute, usually the CAA. For instance,
EPA regulates paint-spraying under the CAA,294 but would
spray-painting a bridge or a shipyard when some paint falls
into the water also require a CWA permit?

C.

Section 404 Decisions

Section 301(a) declares that the addition of pollutants to
navigable waters from point sources is unlawful, except
in compliance with a §402 or §404 permit. The decisions
reviewed earlier in this Article primarily concerned additions not in compliance with §402 permits. The following
decisions concern activities not in compliance with §404
permits. The only structural differences between the two
is that §402 authorizes EPA and states with approved programs to issue permits for discharges of “pollutants,” while
§404 authorizes the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the
Corps) and states with approved programs to issue permits
for discharges of “dredged or fill material.”295 The §502(6)
definition of “pollutant” includes “dredged spoil,” which
appears to be synonymous with “dredged material,” while
that definition does not include “fill material.” Most materials used as fill, however, fall under the broad §502(6) definition of “pollutant.”296 This poses a potential ambiguity:
Under which section should a permit be issued when the
fill material added to navigable water consists of or contains pollutants? Under §402 because the material contains
pollutants, or under §404 because the pollutants are fill
material? Section §402(a) suggests a solution to this problem by authorizing EPA to issue permits for the discharge
294. 40 C.F.R. §§11511, 11514, 11516, 11519 & 11522.
295. The approval of state programs is more limited under §404 than under
§402. Compare §404(g), with §402(b).
296. For instance, biological material, rock, and sand. See §502(6).
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of pollutants, “except as provided in [§404.]” Accordingly,
the Corps is to issue permits under §404 for the addition of
dredged or fill material and EPA is to issue permits under
§402 for the addition of other pollutants.297 EPA and the
Corps define “fill material” to mean “material [that] has the
effect of . . . [c]hanging the bottom elevation of water.”298
Section 404 has come to be seen as the guardian of wetlands. Its scope, however, is too narrow to achieve that goal.
Most reported §404 decisions concern the issue of whether
particular landclearing and related wetlands development
activities require §404 permits. By definition, §404 only
regulates additions of material to wetlands or other navigable water, not extractions of material or water from wetlands or other navigable water. Landclearing or drainage
activities do not inherently fill or add material to wetlands.
Indeed, if wetlands developers could sweep a giant vacuum
device over a wetland and suck up all the vegetation, other
loose material, and water, they could clear and dry the
wetland, without adding anything to it or filling it in any
way, as long as they emptied the vacuum cleaner elsewhere
on dry land. Thus, owners of wetlands can drain them to
dry land with impunity, as long as they add no pollutants
while doing so, even if they intend later to fill the dried former wetlands.299 In terms of damage to wetlands, removal
of wetland soils harms wetlands as much or more than filling wetlands with wetlands soils, but §404 regulates only
the latter.
Section 404 landclearing decisions run a spectrum from
moving unwanted material from one part of a wetland to
fill other parts of the same wetland, which almost all courts
consider addition,300 to the sort of incidental fallback that
occurs when digging a hole in sand and some sand trickles
back from the shovel into the hole, which almost all courts
hold is not addition.301 Most of the decisions on the spectrum in between broadly interpret “addition” to require
297. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeastern Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S.
261 (2009).
298. 40 C.F.R. §232.2.
299. See, e.g., Save Our Cmty. v. U.S. EPA, 971 F.2d 1195, 22 ELR 21532 (5th
Cir. 1992). See also Orleans Audubon Soc’y v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901, 15 ELR
20030 (5th Cir. 1984) (the deliberate drainage of a swamp is not the discharge of fill material); and Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh,
715 F.2d 897, 13 ELR 2094 (5th Cir. 1983). The notion that, once drained,
a wetland may be filled because it is no longer navigable water, however, is
at odds with the well-established doctrine that once a water is navigable, it
is always navigable. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S.
377, 408 (1940).
300. See, e.g., United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir.
2009); Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810,
32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331,
30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. M.C.C. of Fla., Inc., 772
F.2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th Cir. 1985); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League,
Inc., 715 F.2d 897; United States v. Fabian, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D.
Ind. 2007); N.C. Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assoc., LLC, 278
F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003); United States v. Hummel, 2003 WL
1845365 (N.D. Ill. 2003); United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., 33
F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1998); United States v. Sinclair Oil Co., 767 F.
Supp. 200, 21 ELR 21323 (D. Mont. 1990).
301. See, e.g., National Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d
1399, 28 ELR 21318 (D.C. Cir. 1998); National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2007 WL 259944 (D.D.C.); American Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 27 ELR 20589
(D.D.C. 1997).
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§404 permits. After examining these decisions, the Article
will consider how they square with EPA’s “from the outside
world” gloss on “addition” and the Agency’s theory of unitary navigable water.

1.

Redeposit

Most redeposit decisions are rooted in Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh,302 in which an environmental
group challenged a soybean farmer’s clearing of woodlands that exhibited wetlands characteristics, without a
§404 permit. The defendants and the government had
argued before the district court that landclearing by the
mere removal of wetlands vegetation without a §404
permit was not an addition and therefore not a violation
of §301(a). The district court rejected this argument as
“untenable” because it would “frustrate the ecological
purposes of the CWA.”303 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit did not reach the issue on appeal,
because the district court’s factual findings demonstrated that defendant’s landclearing activities included
filling small sloughs, partially filling large sloughs, digging holes, and burying logs in them, rendering this
more than a “mere removal” case.304 The court held that
“‘addition’ . . . may reasonably be understood to include
‘redeposit,’” finding that definition consistent with both
the purpose and the legislative history of the CWA.305
The court noted in passing that the EPA’s “outside world”
theory might jeopardize the application of §404, but did
not address the issue because no party raised it.306
Avoyelles involved landclearing activity in which defendants moved materials considerable distances, for redeposit in the same wetlands. Other decisions consider more
modest movement of material, many of them involving
“sidecasting.” Sidecasting occurs when soil is removed by
digging a hole, often a ditch, and the soil is then placed
beside the hole, an activity that moves material but does
not add new material. In United States v. Deaton,307 the
defendant argued that sidecasting could not be addition,
because the ordinary meaning of addition is the introduction of new material or an increase in the amount of
material already there, while in sidecasting, there is no new
material or increase in the amount of material.308 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the CWA does not prohibit the addition of “material,” but
rather prohibits the addition of a “pollutant.” Earth and
vegetable matter are not “dredged spoil” before they are
excavated by defendants, but once they are removed from
the ditch, they became “dredged spoil,” which is a “pollutant.” When defendants redeposit the material in the
302. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc., 715 F.2d 897.
303. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 536, 11
ELR 20315 (W.D. La. 1979).
304. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc., 715 F.2d at 923.
305. Id.
306. 715 F.2d at 924, n.43.
307. 209 F.3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000).
308. Deaton, 209 F.3d at 335.
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wetland, they add a pollutant where there had been no pollutant before.
The court’s semantic sleight of hand is ingenious, almost
metaphysical. But it ignores that much, if not all, of the
soil and vegetative matter moved were “pollutants” under
the statute’s definition, even before they became dredged
spoil.309 The Supreme Court also impliedly rejected the
theory in Miccosukee when it adopted the Second Circuit’s
Catskill I soup-ladle analogy for addition.310 In it, the soup
in the pot represents navigable water (whether one body
of navigable water or unitary navigable waters). Let’s say
the soup is cream of asparagus soup; it consists of water
and some biological material (cream, asparagus pieces,
and asparagus residue), just as wetlands bottoms consists
of water and biological material (wetlands vegetation and
the organic portion of the soil). The ladle lifts soup from
the pot and pours it back in, adding nothing, according to
the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit. Why would
pouring the cream and asparagus residue and pieces from
the soup back into the soup pot add pollutants to the water
where there were none before?311 Because they were not
pollutants before they were taken from the soup, but they
were pollutants when they are replaced in the soup? That is
a strained reading. Strained reading, of course, is far from
plain meaning, the preferred reading of “addition.”312
The Fourth Circuit in Deaton justified its reading of the
statute by reference to the statute’s purpose; dredged spoil is
as harmful to the waters of the United States whether it was
dredged from the same or different waters.313 That, however, depends entirely on what the court means by harmful. If the harm is pollution, moving indigenous biological
material, sand, or soil from one part of a natural wetland to
another part of the same wetland is far less harmful than
moving dredged spoil laden with heavy metals and toxic
pollutants from a navigation channel or port bottom to
a natural wetland, the initial focus of §404. Moreover, if
the purpose of §404 is to prevent the loss of wetlands, the
harm consists of the destruction of wetlands by digging
drainage ditches in them, not regulated by §404, rather
than by redepositing or sidecasting some of the wetlands
dug to form the ditches, apparently regulated by §404.
309. The definition lists “biological material” as a pollutant and “biological material” includes vegetation and the organic portion of the soil. See §502(6).
The definition states that biological material and other substances are pollutants when they are “discharged into water.” Although the courts engaged
in this metaphysical transformation do not cite the phrase, it does support
their arguments. However, the phrase seems to be a meaningless redundancy. It certainly would have been an odd and roundabout way for Congress
to have established that redepositing or sidecasting dredged spoil requires a
§404 permit. When Congress enacted this definition, it considered §404 to
regulate the disposal of spoil from river and harbor dredging far from the
site of the dredging. In this context, the dredged material would not have
been from the same place as the disposal site, and the metaphysical transformation would have been unnecessary.
310. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
110, 34 ELR 20021 (2004); Catskill I, 273 F.3d 481, 492.
311. The D.C. Circuit rejected such a notion in National Mining Ass’n v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 28 ELR 21318 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
312. See Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961) (where
“[t]he statute admits a reasonable construction which gives effect to all of its
provisions . . . we will not adopt a strained reading”).
313. United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 336, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Despite the strained reasoning of Deaton, subsequent
sidecasting and similar decisions followed it. Addressing
the argument that sidecasting adds nothing new to the
wetland, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Cundiff 314
combined Deaton’s metamorphosis theory with the Avoyelles conclusion that any other interpretation of addition
would read §404 out of the statute.315 Cundiff further supported its decision with a nod to Chevron deference,316
but since neither EPA nor the Corps defined “addition”
in regulations, it is not apparent how Chevron deference is
relevant. A Michigan district court held in United States v.
Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc.317 that sidecasting in the construction of drainage canals in a peat-harvesting operation
was not incidental fallback, but instead was “purposeful
relocation”—in other words, “addition.”318
Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers319 held that “deep ripping” of wetlands constitutes
addition. Deep ripping pokes holes in a relatively impermeable layer of soil beneath a wetland, so that the wetland
drains. In the process, the soil is “wrenched up, moved
around, and redeposited somewhere else.”320 When the
defendant argued that he added nothing new to the wetland, the Ninth Circuit cited Deaton and Avoyelles and
rejected an argument that only incidental fallback took
place. An Illinois district court in United States v. Hummel321 even held that material excavated to create a ditch
for sewer lines in a wetland was added to the wetland when
the material was placed on top of the sewer lines to fill
the ditch. Perhaps, the most extreme of these decisions is
United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc.,322 where the Eleventh Circuit held that a tugboat propeller in essence dug
a channel by repeatedly traversing the same area, pushing bottom sediment onto adjacent sea grass beds, thereby
adding dredge spoil to the sea grass beds by redepositing
the material onto the ocean bed, a dubious application of
Avoyelles.323 There are similar decisions,324 and few contrary ones.325
314. 555 F.3d 200, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir. 2009).
315. Id. at 213-14. See also Avoyelles, 715 F.3d at 924, n.43.
316. Cundiff, 555 F.3d at 214.
317. 33 F. Supp. 2d 596, 29 ELR 21011 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
318. Bay-Houston Towing, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
319. 261 F.3d 810, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001).
320. Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 815.
321. 2003 WL 1845365 (N.D. Ill 2003) (citing Deaton and distinguishing deliberate redeposit of material from incidental fallback).
322. 772 F.2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th Cir. 1985).
323. M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F.2d at 1506. The material moved from developing
a channel through grass beds was not added to navigable water for two
reasons. First, it was not from the outside world. Second, the material was
not a “pollutant” since it was not “discharged into water,” §502 (6); it was
already in the water and never left the water. The metamorphosis theory will
not work either, for the sediment was never out of the water.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Fabian, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Ind. 2007)
(moving material, including earth, dirt, and sand laterally in a wetland
constituted addition); United States v. Sinclair Oil Co., 767 F. Supp. 200,
21 ELR 21323 (D. Mont. 1990) (moving streambed material to redirect a
channel constituted the redeposit or addition of fill material).
325. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 28 ELR 20299 (4th
Cir.1997) (holding that sidecasting was not addition in a criminal prosecution; two of the three judges on the panel filed concurring opinions,
and the decision appears superseded by the Fourth Circuit’s Deaton decision); United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Ill.

2.
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Incidental Fallback

The “redeposit” decisions discussed above essentially hold
that moving soil and biological material from one part of a
wetland to another part of the same wetlands is an “addition” of the material to the other part of the wetland. As
the points of removal and redeposit converge, however,
that understanding becomes increasingly strained. When
the two points are the same, the ordinary understanding
of “addition” collapses, and the metaphysics of Deaton is
all that remains. That helps explain why courts have drawn
the “addition” line at incidental fallback.
Environmental plaintiffs challenged the Corps’ initial
exclusion from its regulatory definition of “discharge”
the de minimis soil movement that occurs during normal dredging operations. The Corps settled the case and,
pursuant to the settlement, replaced the exemption with
explicit coverage of any redeposit of dredged materials
including “incidental fallback.”326 The National Mining
Association challenged the jurisdiction of the Corps to
regulate “incidental fallback” as an “addition” of dredged
or fill material. Incidental fallback occurs when material
is excavated from water or wetlands by lifting and moving it elsewhere and some of the sediment incidentally falls
back into the water or wetlands from which it is removed.
The Corps argued that under Avoyelles this was “addition.”
But that decision involved removing substantial amounts
of material and intentionally redepositing it some distance
away from where it was removed. It did not involve removing substantial amounts of material and inadvertently
redepositing a small amount of it at or very near the point
of removal.
The D.C. district court in American Mining Congress
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers held that “incidental
fallback” was not “addition” for several reasons.327 Most
importantly, incidental fallback is an inevitable consequence of dredging, and §404 does not regulate dredging
(removing), it only regulates filling; dredging is regulated
by 33 U.S.C. §403. Second, legislative history indicates
that Congress did not intend §404 to regulate “the smallvolume incidental discharge that accompanies excavation
and landclearing activities.”328 Third, the Corps took the
position for 18 years prior to the challenged regulation,
that §404 did not regulate incidental fallback,329 a position also taken by courts.330 Finally, Congress had rejected
amendments to expand the jurisdiction of §404 to include
such incidental discharge.331
1998) (construction of a farm pond where the only discharge is incidental
fallback did not constitute addition).
326. This history is recited in detail in American Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 951 Supp. 267, 269-71, 27 ELR 20589 (D.D.C. 1997).
327. Id. at 273.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 274.
330. Salt Pond Assocs. v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 815 F. Supp. 766, 23 ELR
21026 (D. Del. 1993); United States v. Lambert, 18 ERC 1294, 13 ELR
20045 (M.D. Fla. 1981), aff’d, 695 F.2d 536, 13 ELR 20436 (11th Cir.
1983).
331. American Mining, 951 F. Supp. at 276.
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The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed,332 rejecting the
Corps’ metamorphosis theory that wetlands sediment
becomes a “pollutant” (dredged spoil) once it is removed
from a wetland and thus when it falls back, it is added as
a pollutant for the first time. The court stated that regardless of any “legal metamorphosis,” it “fail[ed] to see how
there can be an addition of dredged material when there is
no addition of material,” reasoning that “Congress could
not have contemplated that the attempted removal of 100
tons of that substance could constitute an addition simply because only 99 tons of it were actually taken away.”333
The plaintiffs argued that the inability to regulate redeposit
of dredged material would read §404 out of the statute,
an observation made by the Fifth Circuit in Avoyelles.334
The court responded the Corps could regulate some forms
of redeposit, but not all redeposit, at least not incidental
fallback redeposit.335 Although the Corps promulgated an
interim revised rule, it did not satisfy regulated industry,
and skirmishes over the details of the incidental fallback
exclusion continued.336

3.

Section 404, the Outside World, and the
Unitary Navigable Waters Theory

Defendants in §404 cases could use EPA’s outside world
gloss on “addition” and its unitary navigable waters theory
as the bases for arguing that §404 does not prohibit many
unpermitted wetlands-clearing operations. When a land
developer moves material from one part of a wetland, a
navigable water, to another part of the same wetland, the
same navigable water, the material arguably does not come
from outside the wetland’s or navigable water’s world. This
is underscored by the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
Second Circuit’s analogy of taking a ladle of soup from
a pot, lifting it from the pot, and pouring it back into the
pot. Nothing is added to the pot. If EPA’s “outside world”
gloss is applied to movement of soil within the same wetlands, no §404 permit is required for most clearing and
filling of wetlands and most reported decisions upholding
CWA actions against such activity are ill-founded, unless
one part of a wetland is “outside world” to another part of
the same wetland.
This “outside world” gloss by itself, however, would not
affect the original purpose of §404, which was to regulate
disposal of material dredged from harbors and navigation
channels and disposed of in noncontiguous wetlands.337 In
such activities, dredged material is taken from one navigable water, a river or harbor, and discharged to another
332. National Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 28
ELR 21318 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
333. Id. at 1404.
334. Id. at 1405. See Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 924, n.43.
335. National Mining, 145 F.3d at 1405.
336. American Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23
(D.D.C. 2000).
337. “Congress understood ‘discharge of dredged material’ to mean open water
disposal of material removed during the digging or deepening of navigable
waterways.” See American Mining, 951 F. Supp. at 273 (citing pertinent
legislative history).
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navigable water, an unrelated wetland, so that the material
dredged is from outside the wetland, and a §404 permit
would be required.
The combination of the “outside world” gloss and unitary navigable waters theory, however, undermines §404’s
applicability in both situations. Whether water and material discharged to a wetland originate from the same
wetland, from a different wetland, or from anywhere in
navigable water, if all navigable waters are one, the dredged
materials do not come from the outside world. Even that,
however, would not eliminate §404 entirely; it would still
apply to filling wetlands with material not originating in
water. But that is not what Congress intended. It enacted
§404 in 1972 to apply to discharges of material from dredging river channels and harbors and discharging them into
nonadjacent waters, including wetlands, and amended it in
1977 to affirm that it applied, inter alia, to filling wetlands,
including by landclearing activities. The “outside world”
gloss and the “unitary navigable water” theory are inconsistent with these congressional objectives.
The Fifth Circuit in Avoyelles recognized in a footnote
that the “outside world” theory could jeopardize the operation of §404, but did not address the issue because no
party raised it.338 The court surmised that no party raised
the issue because “‘dredged’ material is by definition material that comes from the water and a requirement that all
dredged spoil come from outside the water world would
effectively remove the dredge-and-fill provision from the
statute.”339 In other words, the Fifth Circuit suggested that
the “outside world” theory could not apply to §404 because
its application would render §404 without meaning.
Its logic is wrong on at least two grounds. First, the
“outside world” theory would not eliminate the application
of §404; the section would still apply to adding dredged
spoil that originated from outside the wetland being filled,
including the original target of §404, dredged spoil from
harbors and navigation channels. Second, if the “outside
world” theory did eviscerate §404, the most natural conclusion is that the theory is with the CWA and the theory
does not apply to any part of the statute. EPA’s suggestion
that the theory applies to §402, but does not apply to §404
requires interpreting “addition” differently under §402 and
§404, counter to the canon requiring us to “interpret the
same . . . terms in a statute in the same way.”340 It also
ignores the fact that critical use of “addition” is in the
definition of “discharge of a pollutant” in §301(a), which
prohibits the discharge of a pollutant except in compliance with a §402 or §404 permit. EPA’s argument would
require interpreting the same word “addition” differently
depending on whether the allegation was that it was not in
compliance with a §402 or a §404 permit.
338. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 924 n.43, 13
ELR 20942 (5th Cir. 1983).
339. Id.
340. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 324, citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,
484 (1990); United Sav. Ass’n. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assts.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1998). See also Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at
170-73.
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In response to comments that its proposed water transfer rule and the related unitary navigable waters theory
would undermine §404, EPA adopted the Fifth Circuit’s
comments in the Agency’s preamble to the final water
transfer rule: “Because Congress explicitly forbade discharges of dredged material except as in compliance with
. . . [§404], today’s rule has no effect on the 404 permit
program.”341 EPA’s explanation misses the mark, as did
the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit’s observation merely
establishes that dredged material is a “pollutant” and has
nothing to do with whether there is an “addition” of that
pollutant; all elements of the §301(a) prohibition must be
met before a §404 permit is required. While EPA’s “outside
world” theory of “addition” does not itself entirely eviscerate the §404 program, when combined with EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory, they eviscerate most of the
reach of §404. If all navigable waters are one, then moving
dredged spoil from one part of a navigable water or wetland to another part of the same navigable water or another
wetland does not require a permit because the waters or
wetlands are the same.
The current dominant purpose of §404 is to regulate
the disposal of dredge and fill material into wetlands,
most often material redeposited within a single wetland by
landclearing activities. Courts have universally interpreted
“addition” to include redepositing such material from one
part of a wetland to another part of the same wetland.
Their interpretation is compatible with our suggested definition of addition, as well as with EPA’s “outside world”
theory of addition, so long as the part of the wetland from
which the material is taken is located at some remove from
the part of the wetland into which the material is redeposited. Although courts are comfortable with this, they have
balked in applying “addition” to situations where the place
of extraction and the place of deposit are virtually identical, as with incidental fallback. Sidecasting is so close to
incidental fallback that decisions interpreting “addition” to
include sidecasting push the meaning of “addition” about
as far as it can go. EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory,
however, would eliminate the application of §404 in cases
in which spoil is moved from navigable water, including
wetlands, to navigable water, including wetlands, whether
the navigable water or wetlands are the same or different.
EPA avoids this conclusion by stating that its unitary navigable waters theory applies to §402 but not to §404.
EPA’s explanation falls before the canon that statutory
terms are to be interpreted consistently throughout a statute, unless specifically provided otherwise in the statute.

341. 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33703 (June 13, 2008).
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Moreover, the definition of “navigable waters” in §502
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided,
when used in this chapter . . . [t]he term ‘navigable waters’
means . . . .” The CWA does not specifically provide that
“navigable waters” has different meanings in §402 and
§404. EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory is incompatible with §404 and is therefore incompatible with the
CWA. For that reason and others discussed in this Article,
EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory must be rejected in
its entirety.

IV.

Conclusion

EPA has not promulgated a definition of “addition,”
although it has interpreted the element as addition “from
the outside world” and as excluding water transfers. These
interpretations neither define “addition” nor withstand
scrutiny. Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the first
concept in EPA’s “outside world” theory, holding in Miccosukee that a point source need not be the original source
of a pollutant for a point source to add it to navigable water.
The Eleventh Circuit’s Miccosukee decision suggested that
“addition” incorporates the notion of but-for causation, a
principled and useful distinction between actions that add
or do not add pollutants. The definition suggested at the
outset of this Article incorporates that notion: “‘addition’
is the act of a person adding a pollutant to navigable waters
from a point source, when that pollutant would not otherwise be in those navigable waters.”
With few exceptions, when applied to decisions interpreting “addition” in the difficult fact patterns examined
above, the definition suggested in this Article either leads
to results consistent with the decisions or may have done
so if the decisions had made more-detailed findings of fact
to address the causation aspect of “addition.” Section 404
sidecasting redeposit decisions push “addition” to its outer
limit and cross that limit when it comes to incidental fallback. EPA’s “outside world” gloss on “addition,” its unitary navigable waters theory, and the water transfer rule
based on them are all contrary to the CWA’s water quality
standards program, eliminate most of the traditional jurisdiction of its §404 program, and are unsupported by the
CWA. EPA should disavow the two theories and withdraw
the rule. If EPA fails to do so, courts should reject the theories, overturn the rule, and give no deference to the Agency’s interpretations supporting them. Finally, EPA should
promulgate this Article’s suggested definition of “addition”
in 40 C.F.R. §122.2.
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2. South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004)
Court of Appeal Decisions
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4. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 625 F.3d 159, 40 ELR 20014 (4th Cir. 2010)
5. Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Waste Management Dist., 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009)
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7. National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009)
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9. Sierra Club and Mineral Policy Center v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005)
10. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 35 ELR 20049 (2d Cir. 2005)
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13. Alabama Rivers Alliance v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 325 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
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22. Dubois v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir. 1996)
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24. United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 23 ELR 20466 (4th Cir. 1992)
25. Save Our Community v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 971 F.2d 1155, 22 ELR 21532 (5th Cir. 1992)
26. American Mining Congress v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 965 F.2d 759, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir. 1992)
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33. Missouri ex rel. Ashcroft v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 672 F.2d 1297, 12 ELR 20368 (8th Cir. 1982)
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35. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir. 1976)
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TABLE B
ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Decision
Number

Year

+/-a

Type of Caseb

Canons Usedc

Number of
Canons Used

CWA §

Supreme Court Decisions
1.

2006

+

Jud. Rev.

3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12

6

§401

2.

2004

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12

6

§402

Court of Appeals Decisions
3.

2011

+

Cit. S.

4, 10, 11

3

§402

4.

2010

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 3, 10, 11

5

§402

5.

2009

--

Cit. S.

2, 3, 5, 10, 11

5

§402

6.

2009

+

Enf.

3, 10, 11, 12

4

§404

7.

2009

+

Jud. Rev.

1, 2, 3, 4, 7

5

§402

8.

2006

+

Cit. S.

2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12

6

§402

9.

2005

+

Cit. S.

3, 6, 10, 11, 12

5

§402

10.

2005

+

Cit. S.

2, 3, 10, 11, 12

5

§402

11.

2004

+

Cit. S.

2, 3, 10, 11, 12

5

§404

12.

2003

+

Jud. Rev.

4, 10, 11

3

§401

13.

2002

+

Cit. S.

3, 10, 11

3

§402

14.

2001

+

Cit. S.

2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11

6

§402

15.

2001

+

Jud. Rev.

2, 7, 10, 11

4

§404

16.

2001

+

Cit. S.

9, 10, 11

3

§402

17.

2000

+

Enf.

2, 7, 10, 11

4

§404

18.

1998

--

Jud. Rev.

1, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12

6

§404

19.

1997

--

Crim.

1, 10, 11

3

§404

20.

1997

--

Jud. Rev.

8, 10, 11, 12

4

§401

21.

1997

--

Cit. S.

1, 9

2

§402

22.

1996

+

Cit. S.

1, 6, 10, 12

4

§402

23.

1993

+

Cit. S.

10, 11

2

§402

24.

1992

+

Crim.

10, 11

2

§402

25.

1992

--

Cit. S.

3, 10, 11

3

§404

26.

1992

+

Jud. Rev.

2, 3, 5, 10, 12

5

§402

27.

1990

+

Jud. Rev.

10, 11

2

§402

28.

1988

--

Jud. Rev.

1, 3, 10, 11, 12

5

§402

29.

1985

+

Enf.

2, 11

2

§404

30.

1983

--

Cit. S.

11

1

§402

31.

1983

+

Enf.

2, 5, 10, 11

4

§404

32.

1982

--

Jud. Rev.

2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12

6

§402

33.

1982

--

Cit. S.

10

1

§402

34.

1979

+

Cit. S.

10

1

§402

35.

1976

--

Jud. Rev.

10

1

§401

36.

1975

--

Jud. Rev.

10

1

§402

District Court Decisions
37.

2011

--

Cit. S.

10, 11

2

§402

38.

2009

+

Jud. Rev.

3, 10, 11

3

§402

39.

2007

+

Enf.

11

1

§404
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a.
b.

c.

Type of Caseb

Canons Usedc
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Decision
Number

Year

+/-a

Number of
Canons Used

CWA §

40.

2007

--

Jud. Rev.

11

1

§404

41.

2007

+

Cit. S.

11

1

§402

42.

2006

+

Cit. S.

2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12

7

§402

43.

2003

+

Cit. S.

11

1

§402

44.

2003

+

Enf.

10, 11

2

§404

45.

2002

+

Cit. S.

10, 11

2

§402

46.

2002

+

Cit. S.

10, 11, 12

3

§402

47.

2002

--

Cit. S.

11

1

§404

48.

2001

--

Enf.

10, 11

2

§402

49.

2000

--

Cit. S.

9, 10, 11

3

§402

50.

1999

+

Enf.

11

1

§404

51.

1988

+

Enf.

11

1

§404

52.

1988

--

Cit. S.

11, 12

2

§§402/404

53.

1997

--

Jud. Rev.

2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12

7

§404

54.

1995

+

Cit. S.

10

1

§402

55.

1993

--

Enf.

3, 5, 10

3

§402

56.

1990

+

Enf.

10, 11, 12

3

§404

57.

1987

+

Cit. S.

10, 11

2

§402

58.

1982

+

Cit. S.

2, 10, 11

3

§402

59.

1979

+

Cit. S.

2, 5, 10

3

§402

60.

1978

+

Cit. S.

10, 11

2

§402

61.

1976

+

Enf.

10

1

§402

Plus (+) denotes an expansive interpretation of “addition,” minus (-) denotes a restrictive interpretation. Note that
even though the interpretation of “addition” may be expansive, the environmental party may have lost the case for
other reasons.
Avoid absurd results; 2. Broad policy goals, interpret in light of; 3. Deference to agency interpretation; 4. Inclusive or
exclusive nature of definition, interpret in light of; 5. Legislative history; 6. Metaphor, use of; 7. Metamorphosis between
statutory terms (not a canon of construction, but used enough here to note); 8. Noscitur a sociis; 9. Other statutes,
interpret harmoniously with; 10. Plain meaning; 11. Precedent; 12. Structure of statute.
Cit. S. means citizen suit; Crim. means criminal prosecution; Enf. means civil enforcement; Jud. Rev. means judicial review.

